Ponte Giovanna, Chiandetti Cinzia, Edelman David B, Imperadore Pamela, Pieroni Eleonora Maria, Fiorito Graziano
Department of Biology and Evolution of Marine Organisms, Stazione Zoologica Anton Dohrn, Naples, Italy.
Department of Life Sciences, University of Trieste, Trieste, Italy.
Front Syst Neurosci. 2022 Apr 12;15:787139. doi: 10.3389/fnsys.2021.787139. eCollection 2021.
It is only in recent decades that subjective experience - or consciousness - has become a legitimate object of scientific inquiry. As such, it represents perhaps the greatest challenge facing neuroscience today. Subsumed within this challenge is the study of subjective experience in non-human animals: a particularly difficult endeavor that becomes even more so, as one crosses the great evolutionary divide between vertebrate and invertebrate phyla. Here, we explore the possibility of consciousness in one group of invertebrates: cephalopod molluscs. We believe such a review is timely, particularly considering cephalopods' impressive learning and memory abilities, rich behavioral repertoire, and the relative complexity of their nervous systems and sensory capabilities. Indeed, in some cephalopods, these abilities are so sophisticated that they are comparable to those of some higher vertebrates. Following the criteria and framework outlined for the identification of hallmarks of consciousness in non-mammalian species, here we propose that cephalopods - particularly the octopus - provide a unique test case among invertebrates for examining the properties and conditions that, at the very least, afford a basal faculty of consciousness. These include, among others: (i) discriminatory and anticipatory behaviors indicating a strong link between perception and memory recall; (ii) the presence of neural substrates representing functional analogs of thalamus and cortex; (iii) the neurophysiological dynamics resembling the functional signatures of conscious states in mammals. We highlight the current lack of evidence as well as potentially informative areas that warrant further investigation to support the view expressed here. Finally, we identify future research directions for the study of consciousness in these tantalizing animals.
直到最近几十年，主观体验——即意识——才成为科学探究的一个合理对象。因此，它或许代表了当今神经科学面临的最大挑战。这一挑战中包含了对非人类动物主观体验的研究：这是一项特别困难的工作，而当跨越脊椎动物和无脊椎动物门之间巨大的进化鸿沟时，这项工作就变得更加困难。在此，我们探讨一类无脊椎动物——头足类软体动物——具有意识的可能性。我们认为这样的综述很及时，尤其考虑到头足类动物令人印象深刻的学习和记忆能力、丰富的行为表现，以及它们相对复杂的神经系统和感官能力。事实上，在某些头足类动物中，这些能力非常复杂，可与某些高等脊椎动物的能力相媲美。遵循为识别非哺乳动物物种意识标志所概述的标准和框架，在此我们提出，头足类动物——尤其是章鱼——在无脊椎动物中提供了一个独特的测试案例，用于检验那些至少能提供基础意识能力的特性和条件。其中包括：（i）表明感知与记忆回忆之间存在紧密联系的辨别性和预期性行为；（ii）存在代表丘脑和皮层功能类似物的神经基质；（iii）类似于哺乳动物意识状态功能特征的神经生理动力学。我们强调了目前缺乏证据以及一些可能有信息价值、值得进一步研究以支持此处所表达观点的领域。最后，我们确定了对这些迷人动物意识研究的未来研究方向。
