Evolution, Complexity and Cognition Group, Center Leo Apostel, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium.
Biosystems. 2022 Jul;217:104687. doi: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2022.104687. Epub 2022 Apr 30.
A strategy for investigating consciousness that has proven very productive has focused on comparing brain processes that are accompanied by consciousness with processes that are not. But comparatively little attention has been given to a related strategy that promises to be even more fertile. This strategy exploits the fact that as individuals develop, new classes of brain processes can transition from operating 'in the dark' to becoming conscious. It has been suggested that these transitions occur when a new class of brain processes becomes object to a new, emergent, higher-level subject. Similar transitions are likely to have occurred during evolution. An evolutionary/developmental research strategy sets out to identify the nature of the transitions in brain processes that shift them from operating in the dark to 'lighting up'. The paper begins the application of this strategy by extrapolating the sequence of transitions back towards its origin. The goal is to reconstruct a minimally-complex, subject-object subsystem that would be capable of giving rise to consciousness and providing adaptive benefits. By focusing on reconstructing a subsystem that is simple and understandable, this approach avoids the homunculus fallacy. The reconstruction suggests that the emergence of such a minimally-complex subsystem was driven by its capacity to coordinate body-environment interactions in real time e.g. hand-eye coordination. Conscious processing emerged initially because of its central role in organising real-time sensorimotor coordination. The paper goes on to identify and examine a number of subsequent major transitions in consciousness, including the emergence of capacities for conscious mental modelling. Each transition is driven by its potential to solve adaptive challenges that cannot be overcome at lower levels. The paper argues that mental modelling arose out of a pre-existing capacity to use simulations of motor actions to anticipate the consequences of the actions. As the capacity developed, elements of the simulations could be changed, and the consequences of these changes could be 'thought through' consciously. This enabled alternative motor responses to be evaluated. The paper goes on to predict significant new major transitions in consciousness.
一种被证明非常有效的研究意识的策略侧重于比较伴随意识的大脑过程和不伴随意识的大脑过程。但是，与之相关的另一种策略几乎没有得到关注，而这种策略有望更加富有成效。这种策略利用了这样一个事实，即随着个体的发展，新的一类大脑过程可以从“在黑暗中”运作转变为有意识。有人认为，当一类新的大脑过程成为新出现的更高层次的主体的对象时，就会发生这些转变。在进化过程中，类似的转变很可能已经发生。一种进化/发展研究策略旨在确定将大脑过程从“在黑暗中”转变为“点亮”的转变的性质。本文通过推断向其起源的转变序列开始应用该策略。目标是重建一个最小复杂的主体-对象子系统，该子系统能够产生意识并提供适应性益处。通过专注于重建一个简单易懂的子系统，这种方法避免了霍姆斯谬论。重建表明，这种最小复杂子系统的出现是由其实时协调身体-环境相互作用的能力驱动的，例如手眼协调。意识处理最初出现是因为它在组织实时感觉运动协调方面的核心作用。本文接着确定并检查了意识中的几个随后的主要转变，包括有意识的心理建模能力的出现。每个转变都是由其解决适应性挑战的潜力驱动的，而这些挑战在较低层次上无法克服。本文认为，心理建模是从预先存在的使用运动动作模拟来预测动作后果的能力中产生的。随着能力的发展，可以改变模拟的元素，并可以有意识地“思考”这些变化的后果。这使得可以评估替代的运动反应。本文接着预测了意识中的重大新转变。
