Department of Economics, University of Bergamo, Italy.
Department of Economics and Management, University of Brescia, Via San Faustino 74b, Brescia 25122, Italy.
Health Policy. 2022 Jul;126(7):668-679. doi: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2022.04.009. Epub 2022 Apr 26.
Patients choice is at the core of competition in hospital care. In spite of a flourishing literature, little is known about the true process leading patients to choose a specific provider. Most models in this literature assume - without testing - that hospitals are perceived to be homogeneous providers. In this article we take a different direction. We assume that patients have a bias towards some types of hospitals, we test this hypothesis and show which attributes determine this bias. We exploit the characteristic of Italian health care organization, where devolution has allowed regional systems to choose the level of competition and the private-public hospitals mix. We estimate conditional logit models for hip replacement admissions in three regions (Lombardy, Veneto, and Emilia-Romagna) over the period 2014- 2016. We show that, depending on the competition framework (peculiar to each region) patients are aware that some hospitals are best performers in their area and are willing to travel more to be admitted there. This is particularly true for regional health care systems where competition between public and private providers is well developed. Our model provides interesting policy implications: a) the idea that hospitals are different in patients perception should be kept in mind in the architecture of the market for hospital care; b) clinical quality as a driver to patients choice seems to work better in a less regulated competition settings.
患者选择是医院护理竞争的核心。尽管文献丰富,但对于导致患者选择特定提供者的真实过程却知之甚少。该文献中的大多数模型都假设(未经测试)医院被视为同质提供者。在本文中,我们采取了不同的方向。我们假设患者对某些类型的医院存在偏见,我们检验了这一假设,并展示了哪些属性决定了这种偏见。我们利用意大利医疗保健组织的特点,其中权力下放使地区系统能够选择竞争水平和公私混合医院。我们在 2014-2016 年期间为三个地区(伦巴第、威尼托和艾米利亚-罗马涅)的髋关节置换入院估计条件逻辑模型。我们表明,根据竞争框架(每个地区特有的),患者意识到某些医院在其所在地区表现更好,并愿意为此多旅行。这在公共和私人提供者之间竞争良好的地区医疗保健系统中尤其如此。我们的模型提供了有趣的政策含义:a)在医院护理市场的架构中,应该记住医院在患者心目中是不同的这一想法;b)作为患者选择驱动力的临床质量似乎在监管较少的竞争环境中效果更好。