Business College of Beijing Union University, Beijing 100025, China.
Kunming University, Kunming, Yunnan 650214, China.
Comput Intell Neurosci. 2022 Apr 30;2022:5207003. doi: 10.1155/2022/5207003. eCollection 2022.
In this study, we use a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the financial support for science-tech enterprises' innovation with government participation. Based on the game model, the study uses replication dynamics to analyze the stability of evolutionary trajectory in the eight scenarios of enterprises, the government, and the financial institutes. Then, we discuss the effect of the reputation multiplier, the efficiency of firms' innovation output, and the positive socio-economic externalities multiplier by simulation as the important innovative points in this study. The study draws the following conclusions: (1) enterprises will choose high R&D intensity instead of low R&D intensity if the output of former exceeds that of the latter, (2) enterprises' R&D output is closely related to the strategy choices of the government and financial institutes, and (3) enterprises can attract government subsidy by boosting economic and social externalities. The government subsidies to enterprises with high R&D intensity will improve the innovation output by the innovation investment and reputation multiplier. So, the government can implement subsidy policy to boost high-intensive R&D activity. Financial institutes' strategy choice between equity investment and debt investment is influenced by investment yield difference and can influence enterprises' R&D intensity choices.
在这项研究中，我们使用三方进化博弈模型来分析政府参与的科技企业创新的金融支持。基于该博弈模型，研究使用复制动态分析了企业、政府和金融机构在八种情景下的进化轨迹稳定性。然后，我们通过模拟讨论了声誉乘数、企业创新产出效率和正社会经济外部性乘数的影响，这些是本研究的重要创新点。研究得出以下结论：（1）如果前者的产出超过后者，企业将选择高研发强度而不是低研发强度；（2）企业的研发产出与政府和金融机构的策略选择密切相关；（3）企业可以通过提高经济和社会外部性来吸引政府补贴。政府对高研发强度企业的补贴将通过创新投资和声誉乘数提高创新产出。因此，政府可以实施补贴政策来促进高研发强度的研发活动。金融机构在股权投资和债权投资之间的策略选择受到投资收益率差异的影响，并能影响企业的研发强度选择。
