Zhen Jie, Ouyang Juan, Wang Lan
Business School, East China University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai, 201620, China.
Business School, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, 650221, China.
Heliyon. 2024 Aug 23;10(18):e36618. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e36618. eCollection 2024 Sep 30.
Industrial parks are the important carriers to promote regional innovation and economic development. The policy preferences of the government, the support orientation of the industrial park and the innovation willingness of the enterprises in the park play a significant role in promoting the high-quality development of the industrial parks. In order to clarify the decision-making process of each subject, this paper constructs a triple evolutionary game model between the government, industrial park and enterprises in the park, Matlab software is used to conduct simulation research, and the strategy selection of each subject in the process of promoting high-quality development of the park is analyzed, as well as the influence of variables on the evolutionary game. Through numerical simulation, this study finds that the strategy choice of the government and the industrial park is influenced by the cost of innovation management for enterprises. In addition, the innovation willingness of enterprises is affected by the policy preference of the government and the support orientation of the industrial park, the excessive tax preference of the government will lead to negative innovation behaviors of the enterprises, the "inward incentives" support orientation of the industrial park can stimulate the enterprises' innovation willingness on "active innovation", the enterprises behavior of "active innovation" will strengthen the "inward incentives" support orientation of the industrial park in turn. The difference of the benefits and the costs between the two support orientations by the industrial park will lead to the equilibrium points stabilized at different strategy combinations. Based on these findings, countermeasures and suggestions are proposed in this study.
工业园区是促进区域创新和经济发展的重要载体。政府的政策偏好、工业园区的支持导向以及园区内企业的创新意愿，对推动工业园区高质量发展具有重要作用。为厘清各主体的决策过程，本文构建了政府、工业园区与园区内企业之间的三方演化博弈模型，运用Matlab软件进行仿真研究，分析了园区高质量发展过程中各主体的策略选择，以及变量对演化博弈的影响。通过数值模拟，本研究发现政府和工业园区的策略选择受企业创新管理成本的影响。此外，企业的创新意愿受政府政策偏好和工业园区支持导向的影响，政府过度的税收优惠会导致企业的消极创新行为，工业园区“内驱激励”的支持导向能激发企业“主动创新”的意愿，企业“主动创新”行为又会反过来强化工业园区“内驱激励”的支持导向。工业园区两种支持导向的收益与成本差异会导致均衡点稳定于不同的策略组合。基于这些研究结果，本文提出了对策建议。
