Gui Haixia, Xue Jing, Li Yun, Chen Liangcheng
School of Economics and Management, Anhui University of Science and Technology, Huainan, China.
Environ Eng Sci. 2022 Apr 1;39(4):329-341. doi: 10.1089/ees.2021.0192. Epub 2022 Apr 13.
Government subsidy can greatly encourage supply chain enterprises to reduce carbon emissions. To quickly occupy the market, supply chain enterprises form alliances. However, enterprises in the alliance have speculative psychology, and the impact of such free riding behavior on the carbon emissions reduction willingness of supply chain enterprises is still unclear. In this article, government subsidies and free riding behavior parameters are introduced to build a carbon emissions reduction decision model for the government, manufacturers, and suppliers, and the impact of government subsidies and free riding behavior on the decision making of supply chain enterprises is analyzed through evolutionary game theory. The analysis shows that government subsidies have an incentive effect on carbon emissions reduction of supply chain enterprises. After the market stabilizes, even if the government subsidies are gradually withdrawn, the carbon emissions reduction of supply chain enterprises still converges to Pareto optimal equilibrium. The influence of free riding behavior on supply chain enterprises depends on the carbon emissions reduction profit. When the carbon emissions reduction profit is different, the decision of manufacturers and suppliers will be different. The above conclusions provide a reference for governments to strengthen control or enterprises to make decisions on carbon emissions reduction.
政府补贴能够极大地鼓励供应链企业减少碳排放。为了迅速占领市场，供应链企业结成联盟。然而，联盟中的企业存在投机心理，这种搭便车行为对供应链企业碳排放减少意愿的影响仍不明确。本文引入政府补贴和搭便车行为参数，构建政府、制造商和供应商的碳排放减少决策模型，并通过演化博弈理论分析政府补贴和搭便车行为对供应链企业决策的影响。分析表明，政府补贴对供应链企业的碳排放减少具有激励作用。市场稳定后，即使政府补贴逐渐退出，供应链企业的碳排放减少仍会收敛到帕累托最优均衡。搭便车行为对供应链企业的影响取决于碳排放减少利润。当碳排放减少利润不同时，制造商和供应商的决策也会不同。上述结论为政府加强管控或企业进行碳排放减少决策提供了参考。
