College of Business, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China.
College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2021 Jul 16;18(14):7603. doi: 10.3390/ijerph18147603.
To improve low-carbon technology, the government has shifted its strategy from subsidizing low-carbon products (LCP) to low-carbon technology. To analyze the impact of government subsidies based on carbon emission reduction levels on different entities in the low-carbon supply chain (LCSC), game theory is used to model the provision of government subsidies to low-carbon enterprises and retailers. The main findings of the paper are that a government subsidy strategy based on carbon emission reduction levels can effectively drive low-carbon enterprises to further reduce the carbon emissions. The government's choice of subsidy has the same effect on the LCP retail price per unit, the sales volume, and the revenue of low-carbon products per unit. When the government subsidizes the retailer, the low-carbon product wholesale price per unit is the highest. That is, low-carbon enterprises use up part of the government subsidies by increasing the wholesale price of low-carbon products. The retail price of low-carbon products per unit is lower than the retail price of low-carbon products in the context of decentralized decision making, but the sales volume and revenue of low-carbon products are greater in the centralized decision-making. The cost-benefit-sharing contract could enable the decentralized decision model to achieve the same level of profit as the centralized decision model.
为了提高低碳技术，政府已经将其策略从补贴低碳产品（LCP）转变为低碳技术。为了分析政府基于减排水平的补贴对低碳供应链（LCSC）中不同实体的影响，本文采用博弈论对低碳企业和零售商提供政府补贴进行建模。研究结果表明，基于减排水平的政府补贴策略可以有效地推动低碳企业进一步降低碳排放。政府的补贴选择对单位低碳产品零售价格、销售量和单位低碳产品收入具有相同的影响。当政府补贴零售商时，单位低碳产品的批发价格最高。也就是说，低碳企业通过提高低碳产品的批发价格来消耗部分政府补贴。单位低碳产品的零售价格低于分散决策下的低碳产品零售价格，但集中决策下的低碳产品销售量和收入更大。成本效益共享合同可以使分散决策模型达到与集中决策模型相同的利润水平。
