Heidelberg University, Philosophisches Seminar, Schulgasse 6, 69117 Heidelberg, Germany.
University of Amsterdam, Department of Philosophy, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, Oude Turfmarkt 145, 94201 1090 GE, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2022 Apr;92:12-19. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.01.011. Epub 2022 Jan 31.
This paper analyzes the historical context and systematic importance of Kant's hypothetical use of reason. It does so by investigating the role of hypotheses in Kant's philosophy of science. We first situate Kant's account of hypotheses in the context of eighteenth-century German philosophy of science, focusing on the works of Wolff, Meier, and Crusius. We contrast different conceptions of hypotheses of these authors and elucidate the different theories of probability informing them. We then adopt a more systematic perspective to discuss Kant's idea that scientific hypotheses must articulate real possibilities. We argue that Kant's views on the intelligibility of scientific hypotheses constitute a valuable perspective on scientific understanding and the constraints it imposes on scientific rationality.
本文分析了康德假设性使用理性的历史背景和系统重要性。通过研究假设在康德科学哲学中的作用来实现这一目标。我们首先将康德对假设的解释置于 18 世纪德国科学哲学的背景下，重点关注沃尔夫、迈尔和克鲁修斯的著作。我们对比了这些作者的不同假设概念，并阐明了影响它们的不同概率理论。然后，我们采用更系统的视角来讨论康德的观点，即科学假设必须阐明真正的可能性。我们认为，康德关于科学假设可理解性的观点构成了对科学理解及其对科学理性的限制的有价值的视角。
