Meincke Anne Sophie
Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Neues Institutsgebäude, Room C0210, Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Vienna, Austria.
Philos Stud. 2022;179(5):1495-1521. doi: 10.1007/s11098-021-01716-y. Epub 2021 Sep 15.
How many individuals are present where we see a pregnant individual? Within a substance ontological framework, there are exactly two possible answers to this question. The standard answer-two individuals-is typically championed by scholars endorsing the predominant Containment View of pregnancy, according to which the foetus resides in the gestating organism like in a container. The alternative answer-one individual-has recently found support in the Parthood View, according to which the foetus is a part of the gestating organism. Here I propose a third answer: a pregnant individual is neither two individuals nor one individual but something in between one and two. This is because organisms are better understood as processes than as substances. With a special focus on the Parthood View, I explain why a Process View of pregnancy, according to which a pregnant individual is a bifurcating hypercomplex process, surpasses the substance ontological approaches.
在我们看到一个怀孕个体的地方有多少个体存在？在实体本体论框架内，这个问题恰好有两种可能的答案。标准答案——两个个体——通常得到支持主流怀孕容纳观点的学者的拥护，根据该观点，胎儿就像在容器中一样存在于孕育的生物体中。另一种答案——一个个体——最近在部分论观点中得到了支持，根据该观点，胎儿是孕育生物体的一部分。在这里，我提出第三种答案：一个怀孕个体既不是两个个体也不是一个个体，而是介于一和二之间的某种东西。这是因为将生物体理解为过程比理解为实体更好。特别关注部分论观点，我解释了为什么怀孕的过程观点，即怀孕个体是一个分叉的超复杂过程，优于实体本体论方法。
