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基于晋升激励视角的财政分权对环境污染的影响及传导机制

The impact of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution and the transmission mechanism based on promotion incentive perspective.

作者信息

Zhao Lulu, Shao Kaichao, Ye Jingjing

机构信息

Institute of Food and Strategic Reserves, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing, 210000, China.

Business School, Henan Normal University, Xinxiang, 453000, China.

出版信息

Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2022 Dec;29(57):86634-86650. doi: 10.1007/s11356-022-21762-1. Epub 2022 Jul 7.

Abstract

At present, China's economy is transforming from rapid development to high-quality development, and environmental pollution stands out as an urgent need to be addressed. Fiscal decentralization is considered to confer economic incentives on local governments to obtain the right to gain and spend in economic growth. However, at the same time, political incentives are given to local officials under the promotion mechanism based on gross domestic product (GDP) assessment, and these two incentives become key to the environmental performance of the jurisdictions. Therefore, this paper incorporates fiscal decentralization, promotion incentives, and environmental pollution into a unified framework and theoretically analyzes the effects of fiscal decentralization, promotion incentives on environmental pollution, and the intrinsic mechanism of action. Using panel data of 30 Chinese provinces from 2002 to 2018, we examine that fiscal decentralization significantly promotes environmental pollution, and this performance is more obvious in economically underdeveloped regions. In terms of its mechanism of action, fiscal decentralization affects environmental pollution by increasing the demand for foreign direct investment, inhibiting technological progress, and enhancing environmental regulation, while foreign direct investment and technological progress significantly inhibit environmental pollution, but environmental regulation does not present a role of pollution control. Further study finds that under the consideration of "GDP-based promotion incentives," local officials will generate "competition for investment," relax environmental standards for FDI, and generate "competition for growth", which will inhibit technological progress and incomplete enforcement of environmental regulations, thus exacerbating local environmental pollution. On this basis, this paper proposes to further deepen the fiscal system reform, promote the optimization of local government competition system, and effectively restrain the vicious competition behavior of local officials under the fiscal decentralization system, so as to provide relevant insights for realizing China's economic transformation as well as high-quality economic development.

摘要

当前,中国经济正从高速发展向高质量发展转变,环境污染问题凸显,亟待解决。财政分权被认为赋予地方政府经济激励,使其有权在经济增长中获取和支出。然而,与此同时,在基于国内生产总值(GDP)评估的晋升机制下,地方官员也受到政治激励,这两种激励成为辖区环境绩效的关键因素。因此,本文将财政分权、晋升激励和环境污染纳入统一框架,从理论上分析财政分权、晋升激励对环境污染的影响及其内在作用机制。利用2002年至2018年中国30个省份的面板数据,我们发现财政分权显著加剧了环境污染,且这种表现在经济欠发达地区更为明显。就其作用机制而言,财政分权通过增加对外商直接投资的需求、抑制技术进步和加强环境规制来影响环境污染,而外商直接投资和技术进步显著抑制环境污染,但环境规制并未发挥污染控制作用。进一步研究发现,在“以GDP为基础的晋升激励”考量下,地方官员会产生“投资竞争”,放宽对外商直接投资的环境标准,并产生“增长竞争”,这将抑制技术进步和环境规制的不完全执行,从而加剧当地环境污染。在此基础上,本文建议进一步深化财政体制改革,推动地方政府竞争体系优化,有效抑制财政分权体制下地方官员的恶性竞争行为,为实现中国经济转型以及高质量经济发展提供相关启示。

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