Zhang Huaige, Hong Xianpei, Cao Xinlu
School of Business Administration, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics, Guangzhou, China.
School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, China.
Front Psychol. 2022 Jul 18;13:941952. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.941952. eCollection 2022.
Retailers are faced with a dilemma of whether to share demand information with other supply chain members, and if so, how to share it. Our research interest is motivated by the grounds that the value of downstream retailers' sales information to upstream manufacturers is to improve the accuracy of manufacturers' order forecasting. This problem is particularly important in the remanufacturing of closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs). In this study, we consider a retailer (she) as the demand information holder, who sells new and remanufactured products in wholesale to a manufacturer (he) and, simultaneously, she and the manufacturer competitively collect used products from the customers. We explicitly characterize the role of information sharing in a CLSC. We contributed to the information-sharing literature by integrating the existing information-sharing model with dual recycling channels and channel power structure. Previous literature suggests that retailers prefer to share demand information with other firms when the market demand is high. However, surprisingly, we find that when the manufacturer does not play a leading role, the retailer shares her forecast demand information with the manufacturer if the market demand is low. We also show that information sharing reduces the overall profit of the supply chain when the manufacturer dominates the market. In addition, our results also illustrate that information sharing affects the performance of the supply chain mainly by affecting the wholesale price.
零售商面临着是否与其他供应链成员共享需求信息的两难境地，如果共享，又该如何共享。我们的研究兴趣源于下游零售商的销售信息对上游制造商的价值在于提高制造商订单预测的准确性这一观点。这个问题在闭环供应链（CLSC）的再制造中尤为重要。在本研究中，我们将零售商（她）视为需求信息持有者，她以批发形式向制造商（他）销售新产品和再制造产品，同时，她和制造商竞争从客户那里回收二手产品。我们明确刻画了信息共享在闭环供应链中的作用。我们通过将现有的信息共享模型与双重回收渠道和渠道权力结构相结合，为信息共享文献做出了贡献。先前的文献表明，当市场需求较高时，零售商更倾向于与其他公司共享需求信息。然而，令人惊讶的是，我们发现当制造商不占主导地位时，如果市场需求较低，零售商仍会与制造商共享其预测需求信息。我们还表明，当制造商主导市场时，信息共享会降低供应链的整体利润。此外，我们的结果还表明，信息共享主要通过影响批发价格来影响供应链的绩效。
