School of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, China.
PLoS One. 2018 Oct 24;13(10):e0204482. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0204482. eCollection 2018.
With the deepening of the research on supply chain management, scholars have increasingly begun to investigate the impact of fairness on a supply chain, and many conclusions suggest that a simple wholesale price can coordinate a supply chain under specific conditions. However, the corresponding analysis and other optimization mechanisms that affect the situation in which the channel cannot be coordinated are either omitted or given little attention. In this paper, we constructed a dyadic supply chain with a single manufacturer and a single retailer; the manufacturer acts as a selfish leader, and the retailer acts as a follower with fairness concerns and sales efforts. For this setting, we derived the equilibrium strategy solution for a wholesale price contract and cost sharing of effort (CS-E) contract offered by the manufacturer, and the results indicated that both contracts achieved channel coordination with different requirements. Further, the profit of the manufacturer and the sales effort of the retailer under CS-E contracts were never less than those for the wholesale price contract, and there was an interval during which the retailer's profit and utility and supply chain efficiency were better than those under the wholesale price contract. In addition, we described situations in which a CS-E contract is unnecessary. These results should be a useful reference for managerial decisions and organizations.
随着供应链管理研究的深入，学者们越来越开始研究公平对供应链的影响，许多结论表明，在特定条件下，一个简单的批发价格可以协调供应链。然而，影响渠道无法协调的情况的相应分析和其他优化机制，要么被省略，要么被忽视。在本文中，我们构建了一个由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的对偶供应链；制造商充当自私的领导者，而零售商作为具有公平关切和销售努力的追随者。对于这种设置，我们推导出了制造商提供的批发价格合同和努力成本分担（CS-E）合同的均衡策略解，结果表明，这两种合同都通过不同的要求实现了渠道协调。此外，CS-E 合同下制造商的利润和零售商的销售努力从未低于批发价格合同，并且存在一个区间，在此区间内，零售商的利润和效用以及供应链效率优于批发价格合同。此外，我们还描述了 CS-E 合同不必要的情况。这些结果应该为管理决策和组织提供有用的参考。
