Department of Business Administration, Tunghai University, Taichung, Taiwan.
Institute of Service Science, National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu, Taiwan.
Hosp Pract (1995). 2022 Oct;50(4):331-339. doi: 10.1080/21548331.2022.2115776. Epub 2022 Aug 24.
Capitation is a healthcare reimbursement scheme in which a healthcare provider equitable access to funding for services and greater flexibility and budgeting. The objectives of the study are to investigate the effect of capitation signaling on patients' perceived value and trust and on their use intention.
This study was a scenario-based survey to examine interaction design, including capitation policy information and value-added health services information, which act as a combination of to test the hypotheses using signaling theory. Subject may receive the information about health services, information about a capitation policy, both of these two signals, or neither of them.
The results of this study show that signal capitation policy and value-added health service information positively affects patients' perceived value, but not patients' trust. When a patient receives a signal either capitation policy information or value-added health service information, their perceived value, trust, and use intention are significantly higher than those who receive neither signal.
We suggest that high-quality healthcare institutions should consider distinguishing themselves from other low-quality providers by signaling information and allocate resources on value-added health services to enhance patients' awareness of healthy behavior and benefit from implementing a capitation payment scheme. This research contributes to healthcare stakeholders, especially policymakers and service providers, in terms of how best to engage with patients.
按人头付费是一种医疗保健报销方案，通过该方案，医疗服务提供者可以公平地获得资金，并获得更大的灵活性和预算编制。本研究的目的是调查按人头付费信号对患者感知价值和信任的影响，以及对他们使用意图的影响。
本研究采用基于情景的调查，以检验交互设计，包括按人头付费政策信息和增值健康服务信息，这些信息作为一个组合，使用信号理论来检验假设。受试者可能会收到有关健康服务的信息、有关按人头付费政策的信息、这两个信号中的一个或两个都没有。
本研究结果表明，信号人头付费政策和增值健康服务信息对患者的感知价值有积极影响，但对患者的信任没有影响。当患者收到信号（人头付费政策信息或增值健康服务信息）时，他们的感知价值、信任和使用意图明显高于没有收到任何信号的患者。
我们建议高质量的医疗机构应该通过信号传递信息来区分自己和其他低质量的提供者，并将资源分配到增值健康服务上，以提高患者对健康行为的认识，并从实施人头付费计划中受益。本研究为医疗保健利益相关者，特别是政策制定者和服务提供者，提供了有关如何与患者建立最佳联系的信息。
