Weichold Martin, Rucińska Zuzanna
Institute of Philosophy, University of Regensburg, Universitätsstr. 31, D-93053 Regensburg, Germany.
Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, Rodestraat 14, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium.
Phenomenol Cogn Sci. 2022;21(5):1177-1182. doi: 10.1007/s11097-022-09841-7. Epub 2022 Aug 17.
In his recent paper "Getting Real About Pretense: A Radical Enactivist Proposal", Daniel Hutto raises several objections against our so-called praxeological enactivist account of pretense (Weichold & Rucińska 2022). He argues that one should, instead, adopt his radical enactivist explanation of pretend play. In this short reply, we defend our praxeological enactivist account against his objections, and argue that it has crucial advantages over his radical enactivist alternative.
丹尼尔·胡托在其近期论文《认真对待假装:激进生成主义者的提议》中,对我们所谓的关于假装的实践生成主义解释(魏霍尔德和鲁钦斯卡,2022年)提出了若干反对意见。他认为,相反,人们应该采纳他对假装游戏的激进生成主义解释。在这篇简短的回应中,我们针对他的反对意见为我们的实践生成主义解释进行辩护,并认为它相对于他的激进生成主义替代方案具有关键优势。