Meyer Russell, Brancazio Nick
School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia.
Front Psychol. 2022 Oct 21;13:948733. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.948733. eCollection 2022.
Enactivists frequently argue their account heralds a revolution in cognitive science: enactivism will unseat cognitivism as the dominant paradigm. We examine the lines of reasoning enactivists employ in stirring revolt, but show that none of these prove compelling reasons for cognitivism to be replaced by enactivism. First, we examine the of enactivism: enactivism reveals a critical explanatory gap at the heart of cognitivism. We show that enactivism does not meet the requirements to incite a paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense-there is no internal crisis in cognitivism. Nor does it provide inherently better explanations of cognition as some have claimed. Second, we consider the of enactivism: enactivism provides a more attractive, parsimonious, or clear-eyed lens on cognition. This move proves to boil down to a misunderstanding of how theories are selected in science. Instead we lend support to a broader and more desirable way to conceive of enactivism, the recent proposal that enactivism is a . We explain how a philosophy of nature does more than support a single research paradigm by integrating scientific questions into a cohesive picture.
生成主义将取代认知主义成为主导范式。我们审视了生成主义者用以煽动反叛的推理思路，但表明这些都不足以成为用生成主义取代认知主义的令人信服的理由。首先，我们审视生成主义的方面：生成主义揭示了认知主义核心处一个关键的解释缺口。我们表明，生成主义并不满足引发库恩意义上范式转变的要求——认知主义不存在内部危机。它也没有像一些人所声称的那样，对认知提供本质上更好的解释。其次，我们考虑生成主义的方面：生成主义为认知提供了一个更具吸引力、更简洁或更清醒的视角。这一观点最终被证明是对科学中理论选择方式的一种误解。相反，我们支持一种更广泛、更可取的理解生成主义的方式，即最近提出的生成主义是一种的观点。我们解释了一种自然哲学如何通过将科学问题整合为一个连贯的图景，而不仅仅支持单一的研究范式。
