Università degli Studi di Torino, Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences, Via S. Ottavio, 20 10124, Torino, Italy.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2022 Oct;95:118-125. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.08.002. Epub 2022 Aug 23.
Cassirer often pointed out that the physics of his time had progressively become a 'physics of principles' rather than a 'physics of models'. Until the 1920s, Cassirer regarded these principles (the energy principle, the relativity principle etc.) as a constitutive but provisional form of the a priori, imposing specific limitations on the form of the allowable laws of nature. This paper argues that Cassirer shifted the role of the a priori to a deeper level in the 1930s. The a priori acquires a regulative meaning, motivating the search for the laws of nature without providing any particular insight into their form. The paper contends that, in this way, Cassirer embraced what might be called a 'motivational Kantianism'. It can be argued whether this stance still deserves to be called a form of 'neo-Kantianism'. However, depriving the a priori of any specific content allowed Cassirer to attribute a constitutive role to 'statements of principle' without granting them a priori status. This paper concludes that this attitude towards the role of 'principles' in physics sets Cassirer's philosophy apart from its positivist and post-positivist counterparts.
卡西尔经常指出，当时的物理学已经逐渐成为一种“原理物理学”，而不是“模型物理学”。直到 20 世纪 20 年代，卡西尔还将这些原理（能量原理、相对论原理等）视为先天的构成性但临时性的形式，对允许的自然规律的形式施加了具体的限制。本文认为，卡西尔在 20 世纪 30 年代将先天的作用转移到了更深的层次。先天具有调节意义，它激发了对自然规律的探索，而没有提供任何关于其形式的具体见解。本文认为，通过这种方式，卡西尔接受了所谓的“动机性康德主义”。可以争论的是，这种立场是否仍然可以被称为“新康德主义”的一种形式。然而，剥夺先天的任何具体内容，使卡西尔能够将“原则陈述”赋予构成性作用，而不给它们先天的地位。本文的结论是，这种对物理学中“原则”作用的态度使卡西尔的哲学与实证主义和后实证主义的对应物区别开来。
