Ren Min, Guo Hongfeng, Wang Zhihao
School of Statistics and Mathematics, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan, Shandong Province, China.
School of Management and Engineering, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan, Shandong Province, China.
PeerJ Comput Sci. 2022 Jul 21;8:e997. doi: 10.7717/peerj-cs.997. eCollection 2022.
This article focuses on the mining dilemma of block withholding attack between the mining pools in the bitcoin system. In order to obtain the higher revenue, the rational mining pool usually chooses an infiltration attack, that is, the pool will falls into the mining dilemma of the PoW consensus algorithm. Thus the article proposes to apply zero-determinant strategies for optimizing the behavior selection of the mining pool under PoW consensus mechanism to increase the total revenues of the system, so as to solve the mining dilemma. After theoretically studying the set and extortionate strategy of zero-determinant, the article devises an adaptive zero-determinant strategy that the pool can change the corporation probability of the next round based on its previous revenues. To verify the effectiveness of zero-determinant strategies, based on the actual revenue of the mining pool defined and deduced in the paper, it simulates 30 sets of game strategies to illustrate the revenue variation of the mining pools. The simulation results show that the three zero-determinant strategies can effectively improve the convergence rate of cooperation, mitigate block withholding attack and maximize the total revenues of the system. Compared with the set and extortionate strategy, the adaptive strategy can ensure more stability and more revenue.
本文聚焦于比特币系统中矿池之间的区块扣留攻击的挖矿困境。为了获得更高收益，理性矿池通常会选择渗透攻击，即矿池会陷入工作量证明（PoW）共识算法的挖矿困境。因此，本文提出应用零行列式策略来优化PoW共识机制下矿池的行为选择，以增加系统的总收益，从而解决挖矿困境。在对零行列式的设定和敲诈策略进行理论研究后，本文设计了一种自适应零行列式策略，矿池可以根据其先前的收益来改变下一轮的合作概率。为验证零行列式策略的有效性，基于本文定义和推导的矿池实际收益，模拟30组博弈策略来说明矿池的收益变化。模拟结果表明，三种零行列式策略可以有效提高合作收敛速度，减轻区块扣留攻击并最大化系统的总收益。与设定和敲诈策略相比，自适应策略可以确保更高的稳定性和更多的收益。
