School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, China.
School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, China.
Waste Manag. 2023 Feb 15;157:279-289. doi: 10.1016/j.wasman.2022.12.030. Epub 2022 Dec 27.
China's household solid waste recycling system has long faced the challenge of recycling formalization. This process is affected by the complexity of the interdependence of the recycler and resident decisions. The aim of this study was to gain a better understanding of the coevolution of residents' and recyclers' recycling decisions. To this end, this study applied agent-based modeling and network-based evolutionary game methods to construct evolutionary game models based on a two-layer social network. The two layers of heterogeneous social networks depicted the connections between residents and recyclers, respectively. Residents and recyclers choose either formal or informal recycling strategies within layers according to evolutionary game theory. Waste flows and cash flows underlie the interdependent coevolution between the two layers. Using this model, the effects of resident subsidies, recycler subsidies, and regulatory policies on the coevolution of residents and recyclers were simulated. The results showed that the impact of policies on recycling systems relies on long-term social interaction. The trends in the strategic evolution of residents and recyclers were similar, and emerged from their interdependence and mutual influence. Resident-oriented subsidy incentives can promote formal recycling stably and positively. However, recycler subsidies and regulatory policies have opposite marginal promotion effects, as is reflected by the fact that the evolution of formal recycling is insensitive to high recycler subsidies and sensitive to high-intensity regulatory policies. These findings provide a more comprehensive insight into the development of recycling systems and inform the design of waste management policies.
中国的家庭固体废物回收系统长期面临着回收规范化的挑战。这一过程受到回收者和居民决策相互依存的复杂性的影响。本研究旨在更好地理解居民和回收者的回收决策的共同演变。为此,本研究应用基于主体的建模和基于网络的进化博弈方法,基于双层社会网络构建进化博弈模型。两层异质社会网络分别描述了居民和回收者之间的联系。根据进化博弈理论,居民和回收者在各层内选择正式或非正式的回收策略。废物流动和现金流动是两层之间相互依存的共同进化的基础。利用该模型,模拟了居民补贴、回收者补贴和监管政策对居民和回收者共同演变的影响。结果表明,政策对回收系统的影响取决于长期的社会互动。居民和回收者的战略演变趋势相似,这源于它们的相互依存和相互影响。面向居民的补贴激励可以稳定地促进正式回收,但回收者补贴和监管政策具有相反的边际促进效果,这反映在正式回收的演变对高回收者补贴不敏感而对高强度监管政策敏感的事实。这些发现为回收系统的发展提供了更全面的见解,并为废物管理政策的设计提供了信息。