Li Shuhao, Sun Qiang
Business School, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo, 255000, China.
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2023 Jan;30(5):11584-11599. doi: 10.1007/s11356-022-22908-x. Epub 2022 Sep 13.
The standardization of formal recycling and rational subsidy plays an important role in waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling. In order to explore the tripartite decision and evolution path of waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling in different time periods, a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of recyclers, manufacturers, and government are presented. Moreover, the evolution stability strategies and conditions in each period are calculated by replicating the dynamic equation and Jacobian matrix. Numerical simulations on tripartite evolution stability strategies corresponding to different stages of industry development are used to verify the rationality of the model. The results indicate that there is existed an indirect effect between tripartite decisions, and the indirect effect can expand the slack of tripartite decisions' thresholds of waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling. The variable subsidy in waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling proposed in this paper is useful to incentive recyclers to choose a formal recycling strategy, and manufacturers also choose production with recycled materials as subsidy varies. Besides, the appropriate waste electrical and electronic equipment processing fee is a conducive indirect effect for the tripartite decision to the optimal evolutionary stability strategy in waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling and can promote manufacturers to produce with the recycled materials. The research can assist in benefit coordination and behavior adjustment of waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling members and provide a theoretical basis for the government to formulate appropriate recycling subsidies to promote the formal recycling of electronic waste recycling.
规范正规回收与合理补贴在废弃电器电子产品回收中发挥着重要作用。为探究不同时期废弃电器电子产品回收的三方决策及演化路径，构建了一个由回收商、制造商和政府组成的三方演化博弈模型。此外，通过复制动态方程和雅可比矩阵计算各时期的演化稳定策略及条件。利用对应产业发展不同阶段的三方演化稳定策略的数值模拟来验证模型的合理性。结果表明，三方决策之间存在间接效应，该间接效应会扩大废弃电器电子产品回收三方决策阈值的松弛度。本文提出的废弃电器电子产品回收中的可变补贴有助于激励回收商选择正规回收策略，并且随着补贴变化，制造商也会选择使用回收材料进行生产。此外，适当的废弃电器电子产品处理费对三方决策达到废弃电器电子产品回收的最优演化稳定策略具有有利的间接影响，且能促进制造商使用回收材料进行生产。该研究有助于协调废弃电器电子产品回收成员的利益并调整其行为，为政府制定适当的回收补贴以促进电子废弃物回收的正规回收提供理论依据。
