Bordo Michael D, Duca John V
Rutgers University, National Bureau of Economic Research, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, United States.
Oberlin College, Dept. of Economics, 223 Rice Hall, Oberlin, OH 44074, United States.
J Jpn Int Econ. 2023 Mar;67:101245. doi: 10.1016/j.jjie.2022.101245. Epub 2022 Dec 24.
For over two centuries, the municipal (muni) bond market has been a source of systemic risk, which returned early in the Covid-19 downturn when borrowing from securities markets became costly for many private and public entities, and some found it difficult to borrow at all. Indeed, just before the Fed announced its unprecedented intervention into the muni market, spreads of muni over Treasury yields rose in line with the unemployment rate and appeared headed to levels not seen since the Great Depression, when real municipal gross investment plunged 35 percent below 1929 levels. To prevent such a calamity, the Fed created the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) to purchase newly issued, (near) investment-grade state and local government bonds at ratings-based interest rate spreads over the safe OIS benchmark yield. In general, these spreads were initially about 100 basis points above average spreads under more normal market conditions and were later lowered by 50 basis points in August 2020. Despite a modest take-up, our study documents the MLF prevented muni spreads from rising much above those margins (plus a modest 10 basis point fee) and limited the extent to which interest rate spreads could have amplified the impact of the Covid pandemic. To establish the MLF the Fed needed Treasury indemnification against default losses. There were concerns about whether the creation of the MLF could induce moral hazard among borrowers and could undermine the efficiency of the bond market if the facility had lasted too long. Partly for this reason and because the muni market had settled down by yearend 2020, the Treasury terminated the MLF at that time. Future assessments of these downside aspects will help answer the question whether the program's benefits addressed here exceeded its costs.
两个多世纪以来,市政债券市场一直是系统性风险的一个来源,这种风险在新冠疫情衰退初期再度出现,当时许多私营和公共实体从证券市场借款的成本变得很高,有些实体甚至根本难以借到钱。事实上,就在美联储宣布对市政债券市场进行史无前例的干预之前,市政债券收益率与国债收益率的利差随着失业率上升,而且似乎朝着大萧条以来未见的水平攀升,当时实际市政总投资比1929年的水平暴跌了35%。为防止此类灾难发生,美联储设立了市政流动性融资机制(MLF),以基于评级的利差,在安全的隔夜指数掉期(OIS)基准利率之上,购买新发行的(近乎)投资级州和地方政府债券。总体而言,这些利差最初比更正常市场状况下的平均利差高出约100个基点,后来在2020年8月下调了50个基点。尽管认购规模不大,但我们的研究记录显示,市政流动性融资机制防止了市政债券利差升幅远超这些利差幅度(再加上适度的10个基点费用),并限制了利率利差可能放大新冠疫情影响的程度。为设立市政流动性融资机制,美联储需要财政部对违约损失进行补偿。有人担心,市政流动性融资机制的设立是否会在借款人中引发道德风险,以及如果该机制持续时间过长,是否会破坏债券市场的效率。部分出于这个原因,也因为到2020年底市政债券市场已趋于稳定,财政部当时终止了市政流动性融资机制。未来对这些不利方面的评估将有助于回答这里讨论的该计划的好处是否超过其成本这一问题。