Hafezalkotob Ashkan, Nersesian Lia, Fardi Keyvan
La Trobe Business School, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia.
College of Industrial Engineering, Islamic Azad University, South Tehran Branch, Tehran, Iran.
Comput Ind Eng. 2023 Mar;177:108975. doi: 10.1016/j.cie.2022.108975. Epub 2023 Jan 2.
The global economy has experienced a tremendous shock caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and its effects on the normal activities of SMEs, which provide essential driving economic force. Considering that there is currently no precise prediction about the end of this pandemic, many SMEs must make critical decisions about whether to remain in the market during the pandemic or to leave it, investing their assets in a more secure sector of the economy. However, in order to convince SMEs to remain in the market, thus maintaining the damaged economy, governments may variously apply punitive or supportive measures. In this regard, the interaction between SMEs strategies and government measures can be considered as an evolutionary game, in which the governments impose various policies after observing the evolutionary behaviors of SMEs. An evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is derived through a replicator dynamic system, and the available payoff of each player is calculated by Nash equilibrium (NA). Finally, a numerical example is presented, and related managerial insights are proposed at the end of the current study. For instance, contrary to general belief, it can be inferred from investigating possible scenarios that punitive policies are more effective than supportive measures in convincing SMEs to remain in the market.
全球经济因新冠疫情及其对中小企业正常活动的影响而遭受巨大冲击，中小企业是经济的重要驱动力。鉴于目前对这场疫情何时结束尚无精确预测，许多中小企业必须做出关键决策，即在疫情期间是留在市场还是退出，将资产投资于经济中更安全的领域。然而，为了说服中小企业留在市场，从而维持受损的经济，政府可能会采取各种惩罚性或支持性措施。在这方面，中小企业战略与政府措施之间的相互作用可被视为一场进化博弈，其中政府在观察中小企业的进化行为后实施各种政策。通过复制动态系统得出进化稳定策略（ESS），每个参与者的可用收益通过纳什均衡（NA）计算得出。最后给出了一个数值示例，并在本研究末尾提出了相关管理见解。例如，与普遍看法相反，通过研究可能的情况可以推断，在说服中小企业留在市场方面，惩罚性政策比支持性措施更有效。
