School of Finance and Economics, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, China.
School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, China.
Front Public Health. 2023 Jan 6;10:1059252. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.1059252. eCollection 2022.
As an emerging form of medical organization, Chinese mobile healthcare (mHealth) platforms are inherently linked to the continuous use of users, which depends on the quality of the health information provided. However, improving the health information quality of mHealth platforms is still a problem that needs to be studied and solved in order to make the platforms sustainable. Based on the reputation mechanism, this study creates a behavioral evolutionary game model for health information providers (physicians) and managers (mHealth platforms), explores the evolution process and evolutionarily stable strategy of the behaviors in various situations, and uses numerical simulation technology to analyze mHealth platforms' constraints and the influencing factors of health information quality. This study presents three key findings. First, considering reputation, health information managers and mHealth platform providers should not unilaterally optimize health information. Instead, mHealth platforms should have active quality control, and physician groups should provide high-quality health information, which is the ideal evolution of the model. Second, the rewards that physicians receive from patients and mHealth platforms for providing quality health information, the reputation benefits, the penalties that physicians suffer for providing low-quality health information, and the increased probability and cost of rent-seeking behavior that physicians may choose can effectively promote the choice of physicians to provide high-quality health information. Third, the reputation gain of mHealth platforms, the probability of mHealth platforms being exposed, and increased losses suffered from exposure can effectively promote the choice of mHealth platforms to control the quality of health information. This study can provide a theoretical basis for mHealth platforms' health information quality control, which is conducive to the healthy and sustainable development of mHealth platforms and the improvement of user satisfaction.
作为一种新兴的医疗组织形式，中国移动医疗（mHealth）平台的持续使用与用户息息相关，这取决于所提供健康信息的质量。然而，为了使平台能够可持续发展，提高 mHealth 平台的健康信息质量仍是一个需要研究和解决的问题。本研究基于声誉机制，为健康信息提供者（医生）和管理者（mHealth 平台）创建了一个行为进化博弈模型，探索了各种情况下行为的进化过程和进化稳定策略，并利用数值模拟技术分析了 mHealth 平台的约束条件和健康信息质量的影响因素。本研究提出了三个关键发现。首先，考虑到声誉，健康信息管理者和 mHealth 平台提供者不应该单方面优化健康信息。相反，mHealth 平台应该主动进行质量控制，医生群体应该提供高质量的健康信息，这是模型的理想进化。其次，医生从患者和 mHealth 平台获得的提供高质量健康信息的回报、声誉收益、提供低质量健康信息所遭受的惩罚，以及医生可能选择的寻租行为的增加概率和成本，可以有效地促进医生选择提供高质量健康信息。第三，mHealth 平台的声誉收益、被曝光的概率以及曝光所遭受的损失增加，可以有效地促进 mHealth 平台选择控制健康信息质量。本研究可为 mHealth 平台的健康信息质量控制提供理论依据，有利于 mHealth 平台的健康可持续发展和用户满意度的提高。
