As an emerging form of medical organization, Chinese mobile healthcare (mHealth) platforms are inherently linked to the continuous use of users, which depends on the quality of the health information provided. However, improving the health information quality of mHealth platforms is still a problem that needs to be studied and solved in order to make the platforms sustainable. Based on the reputation mechanism, this study creates a behavioral evolutionary game model for health information providers (physicians) and managers (mHealth platforms), explores the evolution process and evolutionarily stable strategy of the behaviors in various situations, and uses numerical simulation technology to analyze mHealth platforms' constraints and the influencing factors of health information quality. This study presents three key findings. First, considering reputation, health information managers and mHealth platform providers should not unilaterally optimize health information. Instead, mHealth platforms should have active quality control, and physician groups should provide high-quality health information, which is the ideal evolution of the model. Second, the rewards that physicians receive from patients and mHealth platforms for providing quality health information, the reputation benefits, the penalties that physicians suffer for providing low-quality health information, and the increased probability and cost of rent-seeking behavior that physicians may choose can effectively promote the choice of physicians to provide high-quality health information. Third, the reputation gain of mHealth platforms, the probability of mHealth platforms being exposed, and increased losses suffered from exposure can effectively promote the choice of mHealth platforms to control the quality of health information. This study can provide a theoretical basis for mHealth platforms' health information quality control, which is conducive to the healthy and sustainable development of mHealth platforms and the improvement of user satisfaction.