Wenwu Xie, Khurram Muhammad Usman, Qing Lian, Rafiq Asia
Institute of Digital Finance, Zhejiang University City College, Hangzhou, China.
School of Business, Zhejiang University City College, Hangzhou, China.
Front Psychol. 2023 Jan 30;14:1096674. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1096674. eCollection 2023.
Under the modern enterprise system, the principal-agent relationship can cause a conflict of interest between the two power counterparts, thus affecting the degree of corporate tax avoidance. As a tool to align the interests of management and owners, management equity incentives can alleviate the conflict of interests brought about by the separation of powers and, therefore, may influence corporate tax avoidance.
We examine the relationship between management equity incentives and corporate tax avoidance from both theoretical and empirical perspectives by using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2020. Firstly, the effect of management equity incentives on tax avoidance is theoretically and normatively analyzed. Secondly, examine the effectiveness of moderating the effect of internal control and distinguishing the ownership of enterprises' nature through regression analysis.
(1) There is a positive relationship between management equity incentives and corporate tax avoidance which means, more the stock incentive offered to executives, the more likely corporations are to pursue tax avoidance strategies aggressively. (2) Internal control deficiencies enhance the positive relationship between equity incentives and enterprise tax avoidance behavior. Therefore, in Chinese enterprises, the lack of an internal control system and the failure of internal control measures are prevalent, and such loopholes can intensify the tax avoidance behavior that arises when executives are subject to equity incentives. (3) The influence of management equity incentives on enterprise tax avoidance behavior is greater in state-owned (SOE) than private enterprises. State-owned enterprises are more likely to increase enterprise tax avoidance behavior when management is subject to equity incentives for reasons such as strict performance requirements, lower regulatory oversight, and less interference from negative information. Finally, our findings have significant implications for policymakers/regulators, public companies, investors, standard setters, managerial labor markets, and the welfare of the overall economy.
在现代企业制度下，委托代理关系会导致两个权力对等方之间的利益冲突，从而影响企业避税程度。作为协调管理层与所有者利益的工具，管理层股权激励可以缓解权力分离带来的利益冲突，因此可能会影响企业避税行为。
我们运用2016年至2020年中国A股上市公司的数据，从理论和实证两个角度研究管理层股权激励与企业避税行为之间的关系。首先，从理论和规范层面分析管理层股权激励对避税行为的影响。其次，通过回归分析检验内部控制调节效应的有效性，并区分企业性质的所有权。
（1）管理层股权激励与企业避税行为之间存在正相关关系，这意味着，给予高管的股票激励越多，企业越有可能积极采取避税策略。（2）内部控制缺陷增强了股权激励与企业避税行为之间的正相关关系。因此，在中国企业中，内部控制系统的缺失和内部控制措施的失效较为普遍，这些漏洞会加剧高管受到股权激励时产生的避税行为。（3）管理层股权激励对国有企业避税行为的影响大于民营企业。由于业绩要求严格、监管监督较低以及负面信息干扰较少等原因，当管理层受到股权激励时，国有企业更有可能增加企业避税行为。最后，我们的研究结果对政策制定者/监管机构、上市公司、投资者、准则制定者、管理劳动力市场以及整体经济的福利具有重要意义。
