Chang Ho-Chun Herbert, Harrington Brooke, Fu Feng, Rockmore Daniel N
Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90007, USA.
Department of Sociology, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA.
PNAS Nexus. 2023 Feb 28;2(3):pgad051. doi: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgad051. eCollection 2023 Mar.
Following the invasion of Ukraine, the USA, UK, and EU governments-among others-sanctioned oligarchs close to Putin. This approach has come under scrutiny, as evidence has emerged of the oligarchs' successful evasion of these punishments. To address this problem, we analyze the role of an overlooked but highly influential group: the secretive professional intermediaries who create and administer the oligarchs' offshore financial empires. Drawing on the Offshore Leaks Database provided by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), we examine the ties linking offshore expert advisors (lawyers, accountants, and other wealth management professionals) to ultra-high-net-worth individuals from four countries: Russia, China, the USA, and Hong Kong. We find that resulting nation-level "oligarch networks" share a scale-free structure characterized by a heterogeneity of heavy-tailed degree distributions of wealth managers; however, network topologies diverge across clients from democratic versus autocratic regimes. While generally robust, scale-free networks are fragile when targeted by attacks on highly connected nodes. Our "knock-out" experiments pinpoint this vulnerability to the small group of wealth managers themselves, suggesting that sanctioning these professional intermediaries may be more effective and efficient in disrupting dark finance flows than sanctions on their wealthy clients. This vulnerability is especially pronounced amongst Russian oligarchs, who concentrate their offshore business in a handful of boutique wealth management firms. The distinctive patterns we identify suggest a new approach to sanctions, focused on expert intermediaries to disrupt the finances and alliances of their wealthy clients. More generally, our research contributes to the larger body of work on complexity science and the structures of secrecy.
在俄乌冲突爆发后,美国、英国和欧盟等国政府对与普京关系密切的寡头实施了制裁。随着有证据表明寡头成功规避了这些惩罚,这种做法受到了审视。为了解决这个问题,我们分析了一个被忽视但极具影响力的群体的作用:那些创建并管理寡头离岸金融帝国的神秘专业中介机构。利用国际调查记者联盟(ICIJ)提供的离岸泄密数据库,我们研究了离岸专家顾问(律师、会计师和其他财富管理专业人士)与来自四个国家(俄罗斯、中国、美国和中国香港)的超高净值个人之间的联系。我们发现,由此产生的国家层面的“寡头网络”具有无标度结构,其特征是财富管理者的重尾度分布存在异质性;然而,民主政权与专制政权的客户网络拓扑结构有所不同。虽然无标度网络总体上较为稳健,但当对高度连接的节点进行攻击时就会变得脆弱。我们的“ knockout”实验指出了这种脆弱性在于一小部分财富管理者自身,这表明制裁这些专业中介机构可能比制裁他们富有的客户在扰乱黑色资金流动方面更有效率。这种脆弱性在俄罗斯寡头中尤为明显,他们将离岸业务集中在少数几家精品财富管理公司。我们识别出的独特模式表明了一种新的制裁方法,即专注于专家中介机构以扰乱其富有客户的财务和联盟关系。更广泛地说,我们的研究为复杂性科学和保密结构的更广泛研究做出了贡献。