社交机器人与意向立场。
Social robots and the intentional stance.
作者信息
Veit Walter, Browning Heather
机构信息
School of History and Philosophy of Science, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
London School of Economics and Political Science, Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
出版信息
Behav Brain Sci. 2023 Apr 5;46:e47. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X22001595.
Why is it that people simultaneously treat social robots as mere designed artefacts, yet show willingness to interact with them as if they were real agents? Here, we argue that Dennett's distinction between the intentional stance and the design stance can help us to resolve this puzzle, allowing us to further our understanding of social robots as interactive depictions.
为什么人们一方面将社交机器人仅仅视为设计出来的人工制品，另一方面却又表现出愿意与它们互动，仿佛它们是真实的智能体呢？在此，我们认为丹尼特对意向立场和设计立场的区分有助于我们解开这个谜题，使我们能够进一步理解社交机器人作为交互式描绘的本质。
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