University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA.
Med Care. 2023 Aug 1;61(8):546-553. doi: 10.1097/MLR.0000000000001875. Epub 2023 Jun 9.
Indiana provides intergovernmental transfers-based supplemental payment to nursing homes owned/operated by the nonstate governmental organization (NSGO) but NSGOs may divert substantial supplemental payments away from participating nursing homes.
The aim of this study was to estimate the effect of participation in the intergovernmental transfers-based Medicaid supplemental payment program on nursing home revenue and expenditures.
Difference-in-differences regressions using Callaway and Sant'Anna method accounting for treatment effect heterogeneity across groups and over time.
All 410 Medicare and Medicaid-certified nursing homes in Indiana from 2009 to 2017 with nonmissing data (N=3170).
The key independent variable is a binary variable indicating NSGO ownership. Outcome variables include total revenue, total operating, clinical, hotel, and administrative expenses as well as profit margins extracted from Medicare Cost Report. Control variables include facility and resident characteristics from Nursing Home Compare and LTCfocus data.
Supplemental payments increased nursing home revenues by about $0.58 million on average but payments were larger in later years. On a per-person per day basis, nursing home revenue increased by $21.9 dollars with an increase in administrative ($11.3), and hotel ($6.9) expenses but a decrease in clinical ($4.67) expenses.
NSGO-owned/operated nursing homes received only a fraction of the total supplemental payments on average, but we observed increased payments to nursing homes in later years. Participating nursing homes did not increase clinical expenses. Our findings raise questions on the transparency of the financing arrangements between NSGOs and nursing homes and the need to link supplemental payments to clinical expenses.
印第安纳州向非政府组织(NSGO)拥有/运营的养老院提供基于政府间转移的补充支付,但 NSGO 可能会将大量补充支付从参与的养老院转移出去。
本研究旨在估计参与基于政府间转移的医疗补助补充支付计划对养老院收入和支出的影响。
使用 Callaway 和 Sant'Anna 方法的差异中的差异回归,考虑了不同组和随时间变化的治疗效果异质性。
印第安纳州所有 2009 年至 2017 年 Medicare 和 Medicaid 认证的养老院,共 410 家,数据完整(N=3170)。
主要自变量为表示 NSGO 所有权的二进制变量。因变量包括总收入、总运营、临床、酒店和行政费用,以及从医疗保险成本报告中提取的利润率。控制变量包括来自 Nursing Home Compare 和 LTCfocus 数据的设施和居民特征。
补充支付平均使养老院收入增加了约 58 万美元,但在后期支付额更大。以每人每天计算,养老院收入增加了 21.9 美元,行政(11.3 美元)和酒店(6.9 美元)费用增加,但临床(4.67 美元)费用减少。
NSGO 拥有/运营的养老院平均仅收到补充支付总额的一小部分,但我们观察到后期养老院的支付额增加。参与的养老院并未增加临床费用。我们的发现引发了对 NSGO 与养老院之间融资安排透明度的质疑,以及需要将补充支付与临床费用挂钩的问题。