Education nationale, académie de Paris, France.
Sorbonne Université, Faculté de Médecine, INSERM U 1127, CNRS UMR 7225, Paris Brain Institute Institut du Cerveau, F-75013, Paris, France; Assistance Publique - Hôpitaux de Paris, Hôpital Pitié-Salpêtrière, Département de Neurologie, Paris, France.
Neuropsychologia. 2023 Sep 9;188:108632. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2023.108632. Epub 2023 Jun 27.
Free will has been at the heart of philosophical and scientific discussions for many years. However, recent advances in neuroscience have been perceived as a threat to the commonsense notion of free will as they challenge two core requirements for actions to be free. The first is the notion of determinism and free will, i.e., decisions and actions must not be entirely determined by antecedent causes. The second is the notion of mental causation, i.e., our mental state must have causal effects in the physical world, in other words, actions are caused by conscious intention. We present the classical philosophical positions related to determinism and mental causation, and discuss how neuroscience could shed a new light on the philosophical debate based on recent experimental findings. Overall, we conclude that the current evidence is insufficient to undermine free will.
自由意志多年来一直是哲学和科学讨论的核心。然而，神经科学的最新进展被认为对自由意志的常识观念构成了威胁，因为它们挑战了自由行为的两个核心要求。第一个要求是决定论和自由意志的概念，即决策和行动不能完全由先前的原因决定。第二个要求是心理因果关系的概念，即我们的心理状态必须在物理世界中产生因果影响，换句话说，行为是由有意识的意图引起的。我们介绍了与决定论和心理因果关系相关的经典哲学立场，并讨论了神经科学如何基于最近的实验发现为哲学辩论带来新的视角。总的来说，我们的结论是，目前的证据还不足以破坏自由意志。
