Bok Hilary
Department of Philosophy and Berman Institute of Bioethics, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, USA.
Neurotherapeutics. 2007 Jul;4(3):555-9. doi: 10.1016/j.nurt.2007.04.001.
Some neuroscientists argue that advances in neuroscience threaten to undermine our freedom. The argument here is that those concerns are instances of a more general concern about the compatibility of freedom with causal determinism, and that denying that our choices are fully determined under causal laws presents a different set of problems for the claim that we have free will. An alternative account of freedom is presented, consistent with determinism in general, and with advances in neuroscience in particular.
一些神经科学家认为，神经科学的进展可能会破坏我们的自由。这里的论点是，这些担忧是对自由与因果决定论相容性的更普遍担忧的具体表现，而否认我们的选择在因果律下是完全被决定的，这给我们拥有自由意志的主张带来了一系列不同的问题。本文提出了一种关于自由的替代性解释，它总体上与决定论一致，尤其与神经科学的进展一致。
