School of Public Administration, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou, 510006, People's Republic of China.
School of International Trade, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu, 233030, People's Republic of China.
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2023 Sep;30(43):97025-97039. doi: 10.1007/s11356-023-28896-w. Epub 2023 Aug 16.
Climate change adaptation technologies (CCATs) have become increasingly important for farmers as they face the challenges of climate change and natural disasters. Despite this, many rural areas still rely on traditional agricultural techniques. To promote the adoption of CCATs in agriculture, it is necessary to explore the incentives and conditions for the effectiveness of the policy. We develop an evolutionary game model to analyze the behavior of local governments and farmers in promoting CCATs. Our findings indicate that, under certain conditions, the promotion of CCATs can achieve equilibrium. The incentive for farmers to adopt CCATs increases within a certain range when local governments provide risk subsidies and cost sharing. When subsidies are too high, however, local governments may choose not to promote CCATs, which reduces the incentives for farmers to adopt them. Publicity is also an important factor in promoting CCATs. Our study provides insight into the development of policies aimed at promoting CCATs in agriculture.
气候变化适应技术（CCATs）对于面临气候变化和自然灾害挑战的农民来说变得越来越重要。尽管如此，许多农村地区仍然依赖传统的农业技术。为了促进农业采用 CCATs，有必要探讨政策有效性的激励和条件。我们开发了一个演化博弈模型来分析地方政府和农民在推广 CCATs 方面的行为。我们的研究结果表明，在某些条件下，推广 CCATs 可以达到均衡。当地政府提供风险补贴和成本分担时，农民采用 CCATs 的激励在一定范围内增加。然而，当补贴过高时，地方政府可能会选择不推广 CCATs，从而降低农民采用它们的激励。宣传也是推广 CCATs 的一个重要因素。我们的研究为制定旨在促进农业采用 CCATs 的政策提供了思路。
