Guangzhou Huashang College, Guangzhou, China.
School of Humanities, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China.
Front Public Health. 2024 Jan 8;11:1290841. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2023.1290841. eCollection 2023.
To effectively address the mental health risks associated with public health emergencies, it is crucial to actively manage rumors. This study explores the dynamic evolutionary process of rumor diffusion and its collaborative governance in public health emergencies. A game-theoretic model is constructed, involving three main actors: regulators, parties involved in public health emergencies (PIPHE), and whistle-blowers. The behaviors and game outcomes of each party are analyzed, and the effectiveness and feasibility of the model are validated through numerical simulations. The findings of this study reveal that various factors, such as regulatory costs, penalty income, reputation damage for regulators; image loss, reputation enhancement, penalty expenditure for PIPHE; and time costs, social responsibility, and reward income for whistle-blowers, all influence the behavioral choices and game equilibrium of each party. Optimization strategies for rumor governance are proposed in this study, including enhancing the sense of responsibility and capability among regulators, increasing transparency and credibility among PIPHE, and encouraging and protecting the participation of whistle-blowers. This study provides a comprehensive analytical framework for rumor governance in public health emergencies, contributing to improving the governance of public health emergencies and maintaining online public health orders for social sustainability.
为有效应对突发公共卫生事件带来的心理健康风险，积极管理谣言至关重要。本研究探讨了突发公共卫生事件中谣言传播的动态演化过程及其协同治理。构建了一个博弈论模型，涉及监管者、突发公共卫生事件相关方（PIPHE）和举报者三个主要角色。分析了各主体的行为和博弈结果，并通过数值模拟验证了模型的有效性和可行性。研究结果表明，监管成本、处罚收益、监管者声誉损失，形象损失、声誉提升、PIPHE 处罚支出，时间成本、社会责任、举报者奖励收益等因素均会影响各主体的行为选择和博弈均衡。本研究提出了谣言治理的优化策略，包括增强监管者的责任感和能力、提高 PIPHE 的透明度和可信度、鼓励和保护举报者的参与。本研究为突发公共卫生事件中的谣言治理提供了全面的分析框架，有助于改善突发公共卫生事件的治理，维护社会可持续发展的在线公共卫生秩序。
