Fürst Martina
Department of Philosophy, University of Graz, Heinrichstrasse 26/5, 8010 Graz, Austria.
Erkenntnis. 2023;88(8):3259-3289. doi: 10.1007/s10670-021-00501-x. Epub 2021 Dec 9.
The cognitive phenomenology debate centers on two questions. (1) What is an apt characterization of the phenomenology of conscious thought? And (2), what role does this phenomenology play? I argue that the answers to the former question bear significantly on the answers to the latter question. In particular, I show that conservatism about cognitive phenomenology is not compatible with the view that phenomenology explains the constitution of conscious thought. I proceed as follows: To begin with, I analyze the phenomenology of our sensory experiences and argue for a (WPH) about sensory phenomenology. Next, I explore how WPH can be integrated into the competing accounts of cognitive phenomenology. I argue that, given WPH, conservatism turns out to reduce phenomenal character to a merely concomitant phenomenon that has no explanatory power when it comes to the constitution of conscious thoughts. In contrast, liberalism is explanatorily more powerful in this respect. Finally, I propose a new version of liberalism that explains how phenomenology constitutes conscious thoughts and fits best with WPH.
认知现象学的争论集中在两个问题上。（1）对有意识思维的现象学的恰当描述是什么？（2）这种现象学发挥着什么作用？我认为，对前一个问题的回答对后一个问题的回答有着重大影响。具体而言，我表明，关于认知现象学的保守主义与现象学解释有意识思维的构成这一观点不相容。我的论证过程如下：首先，我分析我们感官体验的现象学，并论证一种关于感官现象学的（WPH）观点。接下来，我探讨WPH如何能够融入相互竞争的认知现象学解释中。我认为，鉴于WPH，保守主义最终会将现象特征还原为一种仅仅是伴随性的现象，这种现象在有意识思维的构成方面没有解释力。相比之下，在这方面自由主义在解释上更具说服力。最后，我提出一种新的自由主义版本，它解释了现象学如何构成有意识思维，并且与WPH最为契合。
