Shepherd Joshua
Jesus College, Oxford Center for Neuroethics, University of Oxford, Turl Street, Oxford OX13DV (UK).
Riv Internazionale Filos Psicol. 2016;7(2):264-272. doi: 10.4453/rifp.2016.0026.
I focus on Uriah Kriegel's account of conative phenomenology. I agree with Kriegel's argument that some conative phenomenology is primitive in that some conative phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to another kind of property (e.g., perceptual or cognitive). I disagree, however, with Kriegel's specific characterization of the properties in question. Kriegel argues that the experience of deciding-and-then-trying is the core of conative phenomenology. I argue, however, that the experiences of trying and acting better occupy this place. Further, I suggest that the attitudinal component of the experiences of trying and acting is not, as Kriegel suggests, best characterized in terms of commitment to the rightness or goodness of the objects of experience. Rather, I argue that the attitudinal component is best characterized in imperatival terms.
我关注于乌利亚·克里格尔对意动现象学的阐述。我认同克里格尔的观点，即某些意动现象学是原初的，因为一些意动现象属性不能被还原为其他类型的属性（例如，感知的或认知的）。然而，我不同意克里格尔对相关属性的具体描述。克里格尔认为，先做决定然后尝试的体验是意动现象学的核心。然而，我认为尝试和更好地行动的体验才占据这一位置。此外，我认为，尝试和行动体验的态度成分并不像克里格尔所认为的那样，最好用对体验对象的正确性或善性的承诺来描述。相反，我认为态度成分最好用祈使语气来描述。
