Schmidt Philipp
Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria.
Phenomenological Psychopathology and Psychiatry, University Clinic Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany.
Front Psychol. 2018 Jun 20;9:694. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00694. eCollection 2018.
The main aim of this paper is to demonstrate the contributions of phenomenology-inspired approaches to the explanation of psychopathological phenomena. First, I introduce the notion of Explanatory First-Person Approaches (EFPA) which share the assumption that the explanation of consciousness and conscious phenomena necessitates, at least partially, phenomenal facts functioning as explanans. Phenomenal facts refer to facts about structures and processes of consciousness. To differentiate phenomenology from other EFPA and to extract its distinctive feature, I compare phenomenology to the method falling under the category of EFPA it overlaps with the most: new introspective methods as recently described. I then present genetic phenomenology as the distinctive feature of phenomenology and show how particularly genetic phenomenology complements biological explanations of psychopathological phenomena in the context of psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia. Moreover, I present Cognitive Theory (CT) as the most acknowledged EFPA in the broader scientific community, demonstrate CT's limitations in explaining conscious phenomena in the context of psychological disturbances such as depression, and show how genetic phenomenology can also significantly complement the cognitive approach. An example in the context of burnout-depression will be given. The overall argument for the significance of phenomenology is as follows: Genetic phenomenology renders phenomenology a distinctive kind of EFPA; genetic phenomenology can complement one of the most dominant non-EFPA accounts in the science of psychiatric disorders: biological reductionism; and genetic phenomenology can complement the most dominant existing EFPA in the science of psychological disturbances: Cognitive Theory.
本文的主要目的是展示受现象学启发的方法对解释精神病理现象的贡献。首先，我引入解释性第一人称方法（EFPA）的概念，这些方法都有一个共同的假设，即对意识和意识现象的解释至少部分需要现象事实作为解释项发挥作用。现象事实是指关于意识的结构和过程的事实。为了将现象学与其他EFPA区分开来并提取其独特特征，我将现象学与它重叠最多的EFPA类别下的方法进行比较：即最近描述的新内省方法。然后，我将发生现象学作为现象学的独特特征呈现出来，并展示在精神分裂症等精神疾病的背景下，发生现象学如何特别补充对精神病理现象的生物学解释。此外，我将认知理论（CT）作为更广泛科学界最认可的EFPA呈现出来，展示CT在解释诸如抑郁症等心理障碍背景下的意识现象方面的局限性，并展示发生现象学如何也能显著补充认知方法。将给出一个职业倦怠-抑郁症背景下的例子。关于现象学重要性的总体论点如下：发生现象学使现象学成为一种独特的EFPA；发生现象学可以补充精神疾病科学中最主要的非EFPA解释之一：生物还原论；发生现象学可以补充心理障碍科学中最主要的现有EFPA：认知理论。
