关系型关怀与认识不公
Relational care and epistemic injustice.
机构信息
Health Education England, London, UK.
Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge, UK.
出版信息
Prim Health Care Res Dev. 2023 Oct 23;24:e62. doi: 10.1017/S1463423623000555.
The philosophical underpinnings of primary care have been examined from several perspectives in recent years. In two previous articles, we have argued that a relational view of autonomy is better matched to the primary care setting than others, and that view is mainly formed from the descriptors of its practice. Here we develop that analysis further, linking it to other relevant theory: the experience of human suffering and epistemic injustice. We argue that relational care is fundamental to ameliorating epistemic injustice and that relationships are integral to ethical practice, rather than being distinct. We propose that personalised care as described in the NHS Long Term Plan is not possible without addressing epistemic injustice and therefore without reconsidering our existing normative ethical frameworks.
近年来，人们从多个角度探讨了基层医疗的哲学基础。在前两篇文章中，我们认为，与其他观点相比，自主的关系观点更适合基层医疗环境，而这种观点主要是由其实践的描述形成的。在这里，我们进一步发展了这种分析，将其与其他相关理论联系起来：人类苦难的体验和认识正义。我们认为，关系护理对于缓解认识不公正至关重要，而关系是伦理实践的组成部分，而不是与之不同。我们提出，没有解决认识不公正问题，就不可能实现国民保健制度长期计划中所描述的个性化护理，因此，也就不可能不重新考虑我们现有的规范伦理框架。
Zotero 插件