Carel Havi
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Cotham House, Bristol, BS6 6JL UK.
Cont Philos Rev. 2021;54(2):201-217. doi: 10.1007/s11007-021-09538-9. Epub 2021 Mar 9.
The phenomenological method (or rather, methods) has been fruitfully used to study the experience of illness in recent years. However, the role of illness is not merely that of a passive object for phenomenological scrutiny. I propose that illness, and pathology more generally, can be developed into a phenomenological method in their own right. I claim that studying cases of pathology, breakdown, and illness offer illumination not only of these experiences, but also of normal function and the tacit background that underpins it. In particular, I claim that the study of embodiment can be greatly enhanced, and indeed would be incomplete, without attending to bodily breakdown and what I term bodily doubt. I offer an analogy between illness and Husserl's , suggesting that both are a source of distancing, and therefore motivate a reflective stance.
近年来,现象学方法(或者更确切地说,多种现象学方法)已被卓有成效地用于研究患病体验。然而,疾病的角色并不只是现象学审视的一个被动对象。我认为,疾病以及更一般意义上的病理学,就其本身而言可以发展成为一种现象学方法。我主张,研究病理学、机能障碍和疾病的案例不仅能阐明这些体验,还能阐明正常功能及其背后的隐性背景。特别是,我认为,如果不关注身体机能障碍以及我所说的身体怀疑,对具身性的研究将会大打折扣,实际上也会是不完整的。我将疾病与胡塞尔的[此处原文可能缺失相关内容]进行类比,表明两者都是一种疏离的根源,因此会促使形成一种反思性立场。