School of Economics & Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai, China.
Glorious Sun School of Business and Management, Donghua University, Shanghai, China.
PLoS One. 2023 Oct 23;18(10):e0293346. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0293346. eCollection 2023.
Counterfeiting is a serious problem in many industries, and the annual profit and tax losses caused by counterfeit products in China have reached over 60 billion yuan. The focus of this paper is to study the effect of blockchain technology in terms of supervising counterfeit products as well as product quality and service decisions under blockchain from a dynamic optimization perspective. We consider the role of blockchain when disclosing product quality information and develop a dynamic optimization model before and after blockchain adoption using differential game theory. Meanwhile, we solve the model using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and backward induction and conduct parametric, comparative, and numerical analyses of the equilibrium solutions. The main findings are as follows: First, we find that in the absence of blockchain, counterfeit products can reduce brand goodwill and decrease the quality and service level of genuine products; however, supervising counterfeit product sales through blockchain can improve this problem under the critical conditions determined in this work. Second, in the direct sales mode, we find that if the unit operating cost and fixed cost of blockchain are small, the brand owner's adoption of blockchain can not only combat the counterfeiter's profit but also increase its own profit. Third, in the wholesale sales mode, we find that the best conditions in which a brand owner can establish blockchain are only related to the related costs of blockchain, while retailers also need to increase the selling price of genuine products when establishing blockchain. Fourth, we find that supply chain performance and blockchain supervisory effects are sensitive to key parameters through numerical analysis in a quantitative form. These findings have important implications for genuine enterprises in terms of determining the conditions for establishing blockchain to combat counterfeiting and for optimizing product quality and service decisions when using blockchain technology.
假冒伪劣是许多行业面临的一个严重问题,中国每年因假冒伪劣产品造成的利润和税收损失已超过 600 亿元。本文的重点是从动态优化的角度研究区块链技术在监督假冒产品以及区块链下产品质量和服务决策方面的作用。我们考虑了在披露产品质量信息时区块链的作用,并使用微分博弈理论在区块链采用前后建立了动态优化模型。同时,我们使用汉密尔顿-雅可比-贝尔曼(HJB)方程和反向归纳法来求解模型,并对均衡解进行参数、比较和数值分析。主要发现如下:首先,我们发现,在没有区块链的情况下,假冒产品会降低品牌信誉度,并降低正品的质量和服务水平;然而,在本工作确定的临界条件下,通过区块链监督假冒产品销售可以改善这一问题。其次,在直销模式下,如果区块链的单位运营成本和固定成本较小,品牌所有者采用区块链不仅可以打击造假者的利润,还可以增加自身利润。第三,在批发销售模式下,我们发现品牌所有者建立区块链的最佳条件仅与区块链的相关成本有关,而零售商在建立区块链时也需要提高正品的销售价格。第四,我们通过定量的数值分析发现,供应链绩效和区块链监管效果对关键参数非常敏感。这些发现对于正品企业在确定建立区块链打击假冒伪劣的条件以及在使用区块链技术时优化产品质量和服务决策方面具有重要意义。