School of Civil Engineering and Transportation, South China University of Technology, Room 7205, Building 7, Tianhe DistrictGuangzhou, 510641, China.
Department of Management Engineering, Guangxi Polytechnic of Construction, Nanning, 530007, Guangxi, China.
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2024 Feb;31(7):11096-11114. doi: 10.1007/s11356-023-31337-3. Epub 2024 Jan 13.
Low-carbon buildings (LCBs) are still in the early stages of development in China. The promotion and implementation of associated policies are not yet fully matured. Meanwhile, their status as public goods exacerbates the uncertainty and complexity regarding anticipated gains and potential losses. Few studies have explored the impact of perception parameters on the decision-making processes of LCBs' stakeholders. Thus, combined with prospect theory, this paper establishes a tripartite game model composed of governments, developers, and consumers to explore their interactions and influences in different stages. Real-life scenarios are further utilized to validate the effectiveness of the model in predicting the behaviors under respective preferences. The results show that the increase in subsidy and penalty intensity instead diminishes the enthusiasm for LCBs. More specifically, the existing subsidy policies offer limited incentives to consumers. With the addition of the perception parameter, there exist differences in the sensitivity of consumers and developers towards risk levels and potential losses. The findings also highlight the importance of consumers in the LCBs market. Future policies should encourage developers and consumers to jointly promote the LCBs implementation.
低碳建筑（LCB）在中国仍处于发展初期，相关政策的推广和实施尚不成熟。同时，由于其具有公共物品的属性，使得对预期收益和潜在损失的不确定性和复杂性进一步加剧。很少有研究探讨感知参数对 LCB 利益相关者决策过程的影响。因此，本文结合前景理论，建立了由政府、开发商和消费者三方组成的三方博弈模型，以探讨他们在不同阶段的相互作用和影响。进一步利用实际场景验证了模型在预测各自偏好下行为的有效性。结果表明，补贴和罚款强度的增加反而降低了 LCB 的积极性。具体来说，现有的补贴政策对消费者的激励作用有限。随着感知参数的加入，消费者和开发商对风险水平和潜在损失的敏感度存在差异。研究结果还强调了消费者在 LCB 市场中的重要性。未来的政策应鼓励开发商和消费者共同推动 LCB 的实施。
