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探索中国双碳政策下政府-企业-公众的高效演化博弈模型。

Exploring an Efficient Evolutionary Game Model for the Government-Enterprise-Public during the Double Carbon Policy in China.

机构信息

School of Management and E-Business, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China.

Contemporary Business and Trade Research Center, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China.

出版信息

Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2022 Apr 11;19(8):4607. doi: 10.3390/ijerph19084607.

DOI:10.3390/ijerph19084607
PMID:35457481
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9033048/
Abstract

The realization of China's "double carbon" goal is of great significance to the world environment and China's economy and society. Through the establishment of the "government-enterprise-public" evolutionary game model, this paper explores the interaction between government policy guidance, low-carbon technology R&D behavior of enterprises, and public purchase of carbon label products, as well as the micro-driving path, aiming to provide suggestions for the implementation of the "double carbon" policy and carbon label system in China. The results show that the choice of government, enterprises, and public strategies is closely related to their own costs and benefits. Public sentiment can effectively urge the government to actively fulfill its responsibilities. Effective government policy guidance plays a key role in low-carbon technology R&D behavior of enterprises. There is an interaction between low-carbon technology R&D behavior of enterprises and public purchase of carbon label products.

摘要

实现中国的“双碳”目标对世界环境和中国的经济社会具有重要意义。本文通过建立“政府-企业-公众”演化博弈模型,探讨了政府政策引导、企业低碳技术研发行为以及公众购买碳标签产品之间的相互作用,以及微观驱动路径,旨在为中国“双碳”政策和碳标签制度的实施提供建议。研究结果表明,政府、企业和公众策略的选择与其自身的成本和收益密切相关。公众情绪可以有效地促使政府积极履行其职责。有效的政府政策指导对企业的低碳技术研发行为起着关键作用。企业的低碳技术研发行为与公众购买碳标签产品之间存在着相互作用。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/1934f3ca6402/ijerph-19-04607-g011.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/84bd9ef1097a/ijerph-19-04607-g001.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/5ee3e13ea6c2/ijerph-19-04607-g002.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/450a8d5641bd/ijerph-19-04607-g003.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/bb6941102df5/ijerph-19-04607-g004.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/88b626238983/ijerph-19-04607-g005.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/182f48ea81ef/ijerph-19-04607-g006.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/764b040398fc/ijerph-19-04607-g007.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/441157d8308c/ijerph-19-04607-g008.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/b4b91c901a54/ijerph-19-04607-g009.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/f84d0e5083a1/ijerph-19-04607-g010.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/1934f3ca6402/ijerph-19-04607-g011.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/84bd9ef1097a/ijerph-19-04607-g001.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/5ee3e13ea6c2/ijerph-19-04607-g002.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/450a8d5641bd/ijerph-19-04607-g003.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/bb6941102df5/ijerph-19-04607-g004.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/88b626238983/ijerph-19-04607-g005.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/182f48ea81ef/ijerph-19-04607-g006.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/764b040398fc/ijerph-19-04607-g007.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/441157d8308c/ijerph-19-04607-g008.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/b4b91c901a54/ijerph-19-04607-g009.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/f84d0e5083a1/ijerph-19-04607-g010.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c63f/9033048/1934f3ca6402/ijerph-19-04607-g011.jpg

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