School of Economics and Management, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Ganzhou, 341000, China.
School of Foreign Language, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Ganzhou, 341000, China.
J Environ Manage. 2024 Sep;367:122060. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2024.122060. Epub 2024 Aug 5.
The promotion of green intelligent buildings (GIBs) is regarded as an effective way to reduce carbon emissions and environmental pollution. How to formulate a reasonable and practical subsidy mechanism is crucial to promote the development of GIBs. However, there is still a lack of research on dynamic subsidy mechanism. To solve the research gap, based on consumer utility maximization theory, combining Hotelling model, the paper constructs an evolutionary game model between local governments and developers, and discusses the decision-making and evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of both players under the dynamic subsidy mechanism. In addition, the paper defines a symbol event and analyzes in depth the possibility of effective diffusion of GIBs. Finally, the paper provides corresponding policy suggestions and draws the following conclusions: (1) ESS exists only after the introduction of dynamic subsidy mechanism, so it is necessary for local governments to formulate dynamic subsidy policies; (2) Under the dynamic subsidy mechanism, different subsidy adjustment rates will affect the evolutionary efficiency of the system; (3) The sensitivity of influence factors from high to low is as follows: subsidy adjustment rate, financial incentives for consumers, additional taxes for conventional buildings developers, carbon trading income for GIB developers and comprehensive residential benefits for GIB homebuyers. Improving these factors can increase the possibility of effective diffusion of GIBs.
绿色智能建筑（GIB）的推广被认为是减少碳排放和环境污染的有效途径。制定合理实用的补贴机制对于推动 GIB 的发展至关重要。然而，对于动态补贴机制的研究仍然不足。为了解决这一研究空白，本文基于消费者效用最大化理论，结合霍特林模型，构建了地方政府和开发商之间的动态补贴机制下的演化博弈模型，探讨了双方在该机制下的决策和演化稳定策略（ESS）。此外，本文定义了一个符号事件，并深入分析了 GIB 有效扩散的可能性。最后，本文提出了相应的政策建议，并得出以下结论：（1）只有在引入动态补贴机制后才存在 ESS，因此地方政府有必要制定动态补贴政策；（2）在动态补贴机制下，不同的补贴调整率会影响系统的演化效率；（3）影响因素的敏感性从高到低依次为：补贴调整率、消费者财政激励、常规建筑开发商附加税、GIB 开发商碳交易收入和 GIB 购房者综合住宅收益。提高这些因素可以增加 GIB 有效扩散的可能性。
