Valverde P, Fernández J, Buenaño E, González-Avella J C, Cosenza M G
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador, Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales, Quito, Ecuador.
Instituto de Física Interdisciplinar y Sistemas Complejos, UIB-CSIC, Palma de Mallorca, Spain.
Heliyon. 2024 Feb 1;10(3):e25148. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e25148. eCollection 2024 Feb 15.
We investigate an agent-based model for the emergence of corruption in public contracts. There are two types of agents: business people and public servants. Both business people and public servants can adopt two strategies: corrupt or honest behavior. Interactions between business people and public servants take place through defined payoff rules. Either type of agent can switch between corrupt or honest strategies by comparing their payoffs after interacting. We measure the level of corruption in the system by the fractions of corrupt and honest agents for asymptotic times. We study the effects of the group size of the interacting agents, the dispersion with respect to the average salary of the public servants, and a parameter representing the institutional control of corruption. We characterize the fractions of honest and corrupt agents as functions of these variables. We construct phase diagrams for the level of corruption in the system in terms of these variables, where three collective states can be distinguished: i) a phase where corruption dominates; ii) a phase where corruption remains in less than 50% of the agents; and iii) a phase where corruption disappears. Our results indicate that a combination of large group sizes of interacting servants and business people and small dispersion of the salaries of public servants, contributes to the decrease of systemic corruption in public contracts.
我们研究了一个基于主体的公共合同腐败现象出现的模型。存在两种类型的主体：商人与公务员。商人和公务员都可以采取两种策略：腐败行为或诚实行为。商人和公务员之间的互动通过既定的收益规则进行。任何一种类型的主体都可以通过比较互动后的收益在腐败策略和诚实策略之间切换。我们通过渐近时间下腐败主体和诚实主体的比例来衡量系统中的腐败程度。我们研究了互动主体的群体规模、相对于公务员平均工资的离散程度以及一个代表腐败制度控制的参数的影响。我们将诚实主体和腐败主体的比例表征为这些变量的函数。我们根据这些变量构建了系统腐败程度的相图，其中可以区分出三种集体状态：i）腐败占主导的阶段；ii）腐败主体占比不到50%的阶段；iii）腐败消失的阶段。我们的结果表明，互动的公务员和商人的大群体规模与公务员工资的小离散度相结合，有助于减少公共合同中的系统性腐败。
