Business School, Qingdao University, Qingdao, 266071, China.
School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan, 250100, China.
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2024 Mar;31(15):22645-22662. doi: 10.1007/s11356-024-32488-7. Epub 2024 Feb 27.
This paper constructs a green supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. Taking into account the reference price effect of consumers based on the mental accounting theory, we investigate the following government incentive policies: R&D (research and development) subsidy, consumption subsidy, and dual subsidy. For manufacturer-led (M-led) and retailer-led (R-led) supply chains, we evaluate the optimal wholesale price, sales price, green degree of product, and the optimal subsidy of the government aiming to improve the environmental benefit or social welfare. We find that the government goal, power structure and reference price effect impact the design of subsidy mechanisms significantly. First, for M-led supply chain, the government concerned with the environmental benefit goal should only provide R&D subsidy for the manufacturer when the reference price effect is low; otherwise, the government would offer subsidy both for the manufacturer and consumers. However, the government will only offer R&D subsidy when the social welfare goal is adopted. Second, for R-led supply chain, the government aiming to improve the environmental benefit prefers dual subsidy when the reference price effect is low; otherwise, consumption subsidy is preferable. Surprisingly, under the social welfare goal, no subsidy for R-led supply chain tends to be the best option. Intriguingly, embracing the social welfare goal can result in more economic and environmental benefits for M-led supply chain, although the subsidy strategy is less effective than the environmental benefit goal. Our research can provide inspirations and references for designing government subsidy mechanisms in practice.
本文构建了一个由制造商和零售商组成的绿色供应链。基于心理账户理论，考虑消费者的参考价格效应，我们研究了以下政府激励政策：研发（R&D）补贴、消费补贴和双重补贴。针对制造商主导（M-led）和零售商主导（R-led）供应链，我们评估了最优批发价格、销售价格、产品绿色度以及政府的最优补贴，旨在提高环境效益或社会福利。研究发现，政府目标、权力结构和参考价格效应对补贴机制的设计有重大影响。首先，对于 M-led 供应链，关注环境效益目标的政府仅在参考价格效应较低时向制造商提供 R&D 补贴；否则，政府将向制造商和消费者提供补贴。然而，当采用社会福利目标时，政府仅提供 R&D 补贴。其次，对于 R-led 供应链，旨在提高环境效益的政府在参考价格效应较低时更喜欢双重补贴；否则，消费补贴更为可取。令人惊讶的是，在社会福利目标下，R-led 供应链的无补贴策略往往是最佳选择。有趣的是，追求社会福利目标可以为 M-led 供应链带来更多的经济和环境效益，尽管补贴策略的效果不如环境效益目标。我们的研究可以为实践中设计政府补贴机制提供启示和参考。
