School of Transportation Engineering, Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha, Hunan, China.
The Tobacco Monopoly Bureau of Pingjiang County (Branch Office), Yueyang, Hunan, China.
PLoS One. 2023 Nov 6;18(11):e0293924. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0293924. eCollection 2023.
Considering the risk aversion characteristics of supply chain members, how to effectively design the government subsidy strategy and green supply chain strategy is a realistic and urgent issue. Regarding this, we optimize and compare four three-stage Stackelberg game models between government and a two-echelon green supply chain, namely both manufacturer and retailer risk neutral (BN), manufacturer risk aversion while retailer risk neutral (MA), retailer risk aversion while manufacturer risk neutral (RA) and both manufacturer and retailer risk aversion (BA). The government as the leader decides the subsidy rate of green input cost with the goal of maximizing social welfare; the manufacturer as the first follower makes decisions on product greenness and wholesale price to maximize its own interests; and the retailer as the second follower determines retail prices to maximize its own interests. Employing mathematical reasoning and numerical simulation investigate thoroughly the effects of the government subsidies and the members' risk aversion. Results indicate that an appropriate government subsidy investment has a positive effect on optimal decisions and related benefits. Risk aversion is in favor of improvement of product greenness and social welfare while reduction of retail price. With the increase of manufacturer risk aversion, green subsidy investment rate and retailer expected revenue increase; on the contrary, the wholesale price and manufacturer expected revenue decrease. With the increase of retailer risk aversion, the wholesale price and manufacturer expected revenue increase, while green subsidy investment rate and retailer expected revenue decrease. In the model of BN, product greenness and social welfare are the lowest, while retail price is the highest. BA is opposite to BN. In the model of RA, green subsidy investment rate and retailer expected revenue the lowest, while wholesale price and manufacturer expected revenue the highest. RA is opposite to MA. The government should formulate appropriate subsidy policies to encourage manufacturers to produce green products and raise consumers' green awareness. Enterprises should control their own risk aversion and assess the risk aversion of the other party reasonably.
考虑到供应链成员的风险规避特征，如何有效地设计政府补贴策略和绿色供应链策略是一个现实而紧迫的问题。针对这一问题，我们优化并比较了政府与两级绿色供应链之间的四种三阶段 Stackelberg 博弈模型，即制造商和零售商均为风险中性（BN）、制造商风险规避而零售商风险中性（MA）、零售商风险规避而制造商风险中性（RA）和制造商和零售商均为风险规避（BA）。政府作为领导者，以最大化社会福利为目标，决定绿色投入成本的补贴率；制造商作为第一跟随者，做出产品绿色度和批发价的决策，以最大化自身利益；零售商作为第二跟随者，确定零售价格，以最大化自身利益。利用数学推理和数值模拟深入研究了政府补贴和成员风险规避的影响。结果表明，适当的政府补贴投资对最优决策和相关利益有积极影响。风险规避有利于提高产品绿色度和社会福利，降低零售价格。随着制造商风险规避程度的增加，绿色补贴投资率和零售商预期收入增加；相反，批发价格和制造商预期收入减少。随着零售商风险规避程度的增加，批发价格和制造商预期收入增加，而绿色补贴投资率和零售商预期收入减少。在 BN 模型中，产品绿色度和社会福利最低，而零售价格最高。BA 与 BN 相反。在 RA 模型中，绿色补贴投资率和零售商预期收入最低，而批发价格和制造商预期收入最高。RA 与 MA 相反。政府应制定适当的补贴政策，鼓励制造商生产绿色产品，提高消费者的绿色意识。企业应控制自身的风险规避，并合理评估对方的风险规避。
