National Technical University of Athens, Athens, Greece.
J Med Philos. 2024 Apr 20;49(3):283-297. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhae013.
Metaphysical realism about mental disorder is the thesis that mental disorder exists mind-independently. There are two ways to challenge metaphysical realism about mental disorder. The first is by denying that mental disorder exists. The second is by denying that mental disorder exists mind-independently. Or, differently put, by arguing that mental disorder is mind-dependent. The aim of this paper is three-fold: (a) to examine three ways in which mental disorder can be said to be mind-dependent (namely, by being causally dependent on the human mind, by being weakly dependent on human attitudes, and by being strongly dependent on human attitudes), (b) to clarify their differences, and (c) to discuss their implications regarding metaphysical realism about mental disorder. I argue that mental disorder being mind-dependent in the first two senses is compatible with metaphysical realism about mental disorder, whereas mental disorder being mind-dependent in the third sense is not.
关于精神障碍的形而上学实在论认为精神障碍独立于心灵而存在。有两种方法可以挑战关于精神障碍的形而上学实在论。第一种方法是否认精神障碍的存在。第二种方法是否认精神障碍独立于心灵而存在。或者换句话说，就是认为精神障碍是依赖心灵的。本文的目的有三：（a）探讨三种认为精神障碍是依赖心灵的方式（即，通过因果依赖于人类心灵，通过弱依赖于人类态度，以及通过强依赖于人类态度）；（b）澄清它们之间的差异；（c）讨论它们对关于精神障碍的形而上学实在论的影响。我认为，精神障碍在前两种意义上依赖心灵与关于精神障碍的形而上学实在论是相容的，而精神障碍在第三种意义上依赖心灵则不然。
