Forti Bruno
Department of Mental Health, Azienda ULSS 1 Dolomiti, Belluno, Italy.
Front Psychol. 2024 Apr 8;15:1344033. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1344033. eCollection 2024.
According to Loorits, if we want consciousness to be explained in terms of natural sciences, we should be able to analyze its seemingly non-structural aspects, like qualia, in structural terms. However, the studies conducted over the last three decades do not seem to be able to bridge the explanatory gap between physical phenomena and phenomenal experience. One possible way to bridge the explanatory gap is to seek the structure of consciousness within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience. First, this analysis leads us to identify the explanandum concerning the simplest forms of experience not in qualia but in the unitary set of qualities found in early vision. Second, it leads us to hypothesize that consciousness is also made up of non-apparent parts, and that there exists a hidden structure of consciousness. This structure, corresponding to a simple early visual experience, is constituted by a Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings nested within each other. Each individual Spatial Belonging is formed by a primary content and a primary space. The primary content can be traced in the perceptibility of the contents we can distinguish in the phenomenal field. The primary space is responsible for the perceptibility of the content and is not perceptible in itself. However, the phenomenon I refer to as allows us to characterize it as . The hierarchical relationships between Spatial Belongings can ensure the qualitative nature of components of perceptual organization, such as object, background, and detail. The hidden structure of consciousness presents aspects that are decidedly counterintuitive compared to our idea of phenomenal experience. However, on the one hand, the Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings can explain the qualities of early vision and their appearance as a unitary whole, while on the other hand, it might be more easily explicable in terms of brain organization. In other words, the hidden structure of consciousness can be considered a bridge structure which, placing itself at an intermediate level between experience and physical properties, can contribute to bridging the explanatory gap.
根据洛里茨的观点，如果我们希望用自然科学来解释意识，我们就应该能够从结构的角度来分析其看似非结构性的方面，比如感受质。然而，过去三十年进行的研究似乎无法弥合物理现象与现象体验之间的解释鸿沟。弥合这一解释鸿沟的一种可能方法是，通过对体验的质性方面进行现象学分析，在意识本身内部寻找意识的结构。首先，这种分析引导我们确定，关于最简单形式的体验的待解释项，不是在感受质中，而是在早期视觉中发现的单一性质集合里。其次，它引导我们假设，意识也是由非表面的部分构成的，并且存在一种隐藏的意识结构。这种与简单的早期视觉体验相对应的结构，是由相互嵌套的空间所属层次构成的。每个个体的空间所属由一个主要内容和一个主要空间构成。主要内容可以在我们在现象场中能够区分的内容的可感知性中找到踪迹。主要空间负责内容的可感知性，其本身不可感知。然而，我所提到的现象使我们能够将其描述为 。空间所属之间的层次关系可以确保诸如对象、背景和细节等知觉组织成分的质性本质。意识的隐藏结构呈现出与我们对现象体验的观念相比明显违反直觉的方面。然而，一方面，空间所属层次可以解释早期视觉的性质及其作为一个统一整体的呈现，另一方面，从大脑组织的角度来看，它可能更容易解释。换句话说，意识的隐藏结构可以被视为一种桥梁结构，它处于体验和物理属性之间的中间层次，有助于弥合解释鸿沟。
