Gray Jesse, Segers Seppe, Mertes Heidi
Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Bioethics Institute Ghent & Metamedica, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium.
Bioethics. 2025 Jun;39(5):460-466. doi: 10.1111/bioe.13294. Epub 2024 Apr 25.
Mobile health tools are often said to empower users by providing them with the information they need to exercise control over their health. We aim to bring clarity to this claim, and in doing so explore the relationship between empowerment and autonomy. We have identified three distinct models embedded in the empowerment rhetoric: empowerment as information, empowerment as control, and empowerment as values. Each distinct model of empowerment gives rise to an associated problem. These problems, the Problem of Interpretation, the Value Alignment Problem, and the Priority Problem, show that mobile health tools in their current form are either insufficient for empowerment or are self-defeating. These digital health technologies encourage users to adopt an individualized conception of autonomy, one that may weaken the doctor-patient relationship and undermine practices in shared decision making, and ultimately may not deliver on improving the health outcomes for those that need it the most.
移动健康工具常被认为通过为用户提供掌控自身健康所需的信息来赋予他们权力。我们旨在澄清这一说法，并在此过程中探讨赋权与自主性之间的关系。我们已识别出赋权言论中蕴含的三种不同模式：作为信息的赋权、作为控制的赋权以及作为价值观的赋权。每种不同的赋权模式都会引发一个相关问题。这些问题，即解释问题、价值一致性问题和优先级问题，表明当前形式的移动健康工具要么不足以实现赋权，要么适得其反。这些数字健康技术鼓励用户采用一种个体化的自主性概念，这种概念可能会削弱医患关系并破坏共同决策中的做法，最终可能无法为最需要的人改善健康结果。
