Wu Rong, Zhu Lin, Jiang Man
School of Management, Harbin University of Commerce, Harbin, 150028, China.
Heliyon. 2024 Apr 30;10(9):e30559. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e30559. eCollection 2024 May 15.
To solve the problem of insufficient low-carbon operational motivation among cold chain logistics enterprises due to the high investment costs of low-carbon assets and considering the promotional effect of environmental regulatory policies and green credit, an evolutionary game model was constructed for the government, cold chain logistics enterprises, and financial institutions. The stability strategies of each participating entity and the stability of the system equilibrium point were analyzed, and the relevant conclusions were verified through numerical simulations. The research results indicated the following: (1) the initial willingness of the three parties to participate increased, the low-carbon operation of cold chain logistics enterprises and the speed of green credit services provided by financial institutions accelerated, and the rate of strict government regulation slowed down. (2) Moderate subsidies and taxes were conducive to the joint participation of the three parties. (3) Increasing the subsidy for green credit provided positive incentives for financial institutions to provide green credit services, while reducing credit interest rates accelerated the low-carbon operation rate of cold chain logistics enterprises.
针对冷链物流企业因低碳资产投资成本高而导致低碳运营动力不足的问题，考虑到环境监管政策和绿色信贷的促进作用，构建了政府、冷链物流企业和金融机构的演化博弈模型。分析了各参与主体的稳定策略和系统均衡点的稳定性，并通过数值模拟验证了相关结论。研究结果表明：（1）三方参与的初始意愿增强，冷链物流企业的低碳运营和金融机构提供绿色信贷服务的速度加快，政府严格监管的速度放缓。（2）适度的补贴和税收有利于三方的联合参与。（3）增加绿色信贷补贴对金融机构提供绿色信贷服务有积极激励作用，而降低信贷利率则加速了冷链物流企业的低碳运营率。
