School of Water Conservancy, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou, China.
The Henan Key Laboratory of Water Resources Conservation and Intensive Utilization in the Yellow River Basin, Zhengzhou, Henan, China.
PLoS One. 2023 Mar 16;18(3):e0282314. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0282314. eCollection 2023.
To achieve carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals in China, green retrofitting of traditional residential buildings is the one of the important ways. Therefore, the dynamics process of the change of the resident group intention to retrofit and its impact on the behavior of the tripartite game between the government, investment retrofitting enterprises and residents needs to be analyzed. Firstly, a dissemination model of green retrofitting intentions among resident groups is constructed, and it is coupled with the tripartite game model. Then, through numerical simulation, the dissemination laws of intention for green retrofitting among resident groups and its influence on the evolution process of the tripartite game are analyzed. The results show that: (1) The rate at which the triad of government, investment retrofitting enterprises and residents reaches steady state is influenced by the impact of changes in the level of social climate on the rate of conversion of potential and participating residents to immune residents. When the rate of enterprises investment and residents participation increases, the rate of government choice of incentive strategies decreases; (2) greater government regulation and subsidies will increase the intention of residents and retrofitting enterprises to participate. The ideal steady state without government incentives can be achieved when the group size of participating residents is increased by improving the level of government publicity and education and the technology level of the enterprises; (3) the intention of enterprises to invest is closely related to the cognitive benefits and the level of risk perception of residents. The conclusions of the study can be used as a reference for the government to make green retrofitting policies for traditional residential buildings.
为实现中国碳达峰、碳中和目标，绿色改造传统居住建筑是重要途径之一。因此，需要分析居民群体改造意愿变化的动态过程及其对政府、投资改造企业和居民三方博弈行为的影响。首先，构建了居民群体绿色改造意愿的传播模型，并将其与三方博弈模型进行了耦合。然后，通过数值模拟，分析了居民群体绿色改造意愿的传播规律及其对三方博弈演化过程的影响。结果表明：（1）政府、投资改造企业和居民三方达到稳定状态的速率受到社会气候水平变化对潜在居民和参与居民向免疫居民转化率的影响；当企业投资和居民参与率增加时，政府选择激励策略的速率降低；（2）更大的政府监管和补贴将增加居民和改造企业的参与意愿，当通过提高政府宣传教育水平和企业技术水平来增加参与居民的群体规模时，可实现无政府激励的理想稳定状态；（3）企业投资意愿与居民的认知收益和风险感知水平密切相关。研究结论可为政府制定传统居住建筑绿色改造政策提供参考。
