Does a GP service package matter in addressing the absence of health management by the occupational population? A modelling study.

OBJECTIVE

To assess the influence of supply and demand factors on the contract behavior of occupational populations with general practitioner (GP) teams.

METHODS

We employed a system dynamics approach to assess and predict the effect of the general practitioner service package (GPSP) and complementary incentive policies on the contract rate for 2015-2030. First, the GPSP is designed to address the unique needs of occupational populations, enhancing the attractiveness of GP contracting services, including three personalized service contents tailored to demand-side considerations: work-related disease prevention (WDP), health education & counseling (HEC), and health-care service (HCS). Second, the complementary incentive policies on the supply-side included income incentives (II), job title promotion (JTP), and education & training (ET). Considering the team collaboration, the income distribution ratio (IDR) was also incorporated into supply-side factors.

FINDINGS

The contract rate is predicted to increase to 57.8% by 2030 after the GPSP intervention, representing a 15.4% increase on the non-intervention scenario. WDP and HEC have a slightly higher (by 2%) impact on the contract rate than that from HCS. Regarding the supply-side policies, II have a more significant impact on the contract rate than JTP and ET by 3-5%. The maximum predicted contract rate of 75.2% is expected by 2030 when the IDR is 0.5, i.e., the GP receives 50% of the contract income and other members share 50%.

CONCLUSION

The GP service package favorably increased the contract rate among occupational population, particularly after integrating the incentive policies. Specifically, for a given demand level, the targeted content of the package enhanced the attractiveness of contract services. On the supply side, the incentive policies boost GPs' motivation, and the income distribution motivated other team members.