Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Vienna, Austria.
Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Vienna, Austria.
Cognition. 2024 Aug;249:105812. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105812. Epub 2024 May 18.
Successful interactions require not only representing others' mental states but also flexibly updating them, whenever one's original inferences may no longer hold. Such situations arise, for instance, when a partner's behavior is incongruent with one's expectations. Although these situations are rather common, the question whether people update others' mental states spontaneously upon encountering unexpected behaviors and whether they use the updated mental states in novel contexts, has been largely unexplored. We addressed these issues in two experiments. In each experiment participants first performed an anticipatory looking task, reacting to a virtual 'partner', who categorized pictures based on their ambiguous or non-ambiguous color. Importantly, to perform the task participants did not have to track their partner's perspective. Following a correct categorization phase, the 'partner' started to systematically miscategorize one of the ambiguous colors (e.g., as if she would now believe that the greenish blue is green). We measured how participants' anticipatory looking preceding the partner's categorization changed across trials. Afterward, we asked whether participants implicitly transferred their knowledge about the partner's updated perspective to a new task. Finally, they performed an explicit perspective-taking task, to test whether they selectively updated the partner's perspective, but not their own. Results revealed that correct anticipations started to emerge only after a few miscategorizations, indicating the spontaneous updating of the other's perspective regarding the miscategorized color. Signatures of updating emerged somewhat earlier when the partner made similarity judgments (Experiment 2), highlighting the subjective nature of her decisions, compared to when following an explicit color-categorization rule (Experiment 1). In the explicit perspective-taking task of both experiments, roughly half of the participants could categorize items according to the partner's (spontaneously updated) perspective and also used their partner's updated perspective in the implicit transfer task to some degree, while they were the ones who displayed more pronounced anticipatory patterns as well. Such data provides strong evidence that the observed changes in anticipatory looking reflect spontaneous and flexible mental state updating. In addition, the findings also point to a high individual variability both in the updating of attributed mental states and the use of the updated mental state content.
成功的互动不仅需要代表他人的心理状态,还需要在最初的推断不再适用时灵活更新这些状态。例如,当一个人的行为与预期不符时,就会出现这种情况。尽管这些情况相当常见,但人们是否会在遇到意外行为时自发更新他人的心理状态,以及他们是否会在新的情境中使用更新后的心理状态,这个问题很大程度上仍未得到探讨。我们在两个实验中解决了这些问题。在每个实验中,参与者首先执行了一个预期性注视任务,对一个根据图片的模糊或非模糊颜色进行分类的虚拟“伙伴”做出反应。重要的是,为了完成任务,参与者不必跟踪他们伙伴的视角。在正确的分类阶段之后,“伙伴”开始系统地对一个模糊颜色进行错误分类(例如,好像她现在会认为绿蓝色是绿色)。我们测量了参与者在伙伴分类前的预期性注视在前几个试验中的变化。之后,我们询问参与者是否在新任务中隐式地转移了他们对伙伴更新视角的认识。最后,他们执行了一个明确的换位思考任务,以测试他们是否选择性地更新了伙伴的视角,而不是自己的视角。结果显示,只有在几次错误分类后,正确的预期才开始出现,这表明参与者自发地更新了他们对被错误分类的颜色的看法。当伙伴进行相似性判断时(实验 2),更新的迹象出现得更早一些,这突出了她的决策的主观性,而不是当她遵循明确的颜色分类规则时(实验 1)。在两个实验的明确换位思考任务中,大约一半的参与者可以根据伙伴(自发更新的)视角对物品进行分类,并且在一定程度上也在隐式转移任务中使用了伙伴更新后的视角,而他们正是那些表现出更明显预期模式的参与者。这些数据提供了强有力的证据,表明预期性注视的变化反映了自发和灵活的心理状态更新。此外,研究结果还表明,在归因心理状态的更新和更新后的心理状态内容的使用方面,存在着高度的个体差异。