China Center for Behavioral Economics and Finance, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, Sichuan, China.
PLoS One. 2024 May 20;19(5):e0303558. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0303558. eCollection 2024.
Public tolerance for corruption within a society significantly influences the prevalence of corrupt practices, but less is known about how this tolerance evolves with social norms. This paper presents experimental evidences demonstrating that the descriptive social norm indicating widespread corruption can lead to increased tolerance for corruptive acts. We introduce an asymmetric information ultimatum game to simulate the interactions between embezzlers and citizens. Game theoretical analysis reveals that victims anticipating corruption will exhibit greater compliance with embezzlement when the offers are evaluated based on descriptive norms. To test the hypothesis, we employ a framing effect to induce variations in descriptive norms within a behavioral experiment. Although the treatment effect is significant only in the subgroup of student cadres, this subgroup demonstrated increased beliefs about embezzlement, greater tolerance for corruption, and a heightened propensity to embezzle when exposed to framings with hierarchical implications. This paper contributes to the corruption literature by examining the effects of descriptive norms on victims' responses to embezzlement. It offers a more comprehensive perspective on how social standards shape public opinions and corrupt actions, enhancing our understanding of the self-reinforcing nature of corruption.
公众对社会腐败现象的容忍度会显著影响腐败行为的盛行程度，但对于这种容忍度如何随着社会规范的变化而变化，我们知之甚少。本文通过实验证据表明，描述性社会规范表明普遍存在腐败现象会导致人们对腐败行为的容忍度增加。我们引入了一个非对称信息最后通牒博弈来模拟贪污者和公民之间的相互作用。博弈论分析表明，当根据描述性规范评估时，预期会发生腐败的受害者在面对贪污行为时会表现出更大的顺从性。为了检验这一假设，我们在行为实验中采用了框架效应来引起描述性规范的变化。虽然处理效应仅在学生干部这一亚组中显著，但当接触到具有等级含义的框架时，这个亚组表现出了对贪污行为更高的认知度、对腐败行为的更高容忍度以及更高的贪污倾向。本文通过考察描述性规范对受害者对贪污行为反应的影响，为腐败文献做出了贡献。它提供了一个更全面的视角，说明社会规范如何塑造公众意见和腐败行为，增强了我们对腐败自我强化本质的理解。
